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INTRODUCTION
The high degree of leverage introduced into American corporations
during the 1980s threatens many with bankruptcy reorganization or liq-
uidation in the near future. One of the important components of this
increased leverage is the junk bond phenomenon.
Few widely employed investment instruments have raised so much
controversy in recent years as high-yield debt securities, more popularly
known as "junk bonds." Junk bonds have been praised for their flexibil-
ity and the capital-market access that they provide for their issuers.1 At
the same time, however, they have been condemned for the additional
risk that they have allegedly introduced.2 For example, the Financial
1. See, eg., Merton H. Miller, Leverage, 46 J. FIN. 479, 480-81 (1991) (Nobel Prize Lecture
delivered Dec. 7, 1990, in part defending junk bonds); Hilary Rosenberg, The Unsinkable Junk
Bond, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 43, 44 (1989).
2. Issuers of junk bonds increase their degree of leverage by the issuance of the bonds. This, in
turn, increases the risk that the issuers will not be able to pay their debts as they become due. Junk
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Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA),3 forbids thrift institutions and their affiliates from acquiring or
even retaining already-acquired junk bonds.4 Similarly, the insurance in-
dustry is considering severe limitations on insurance companies' ability
to invest in such instruments. 5
The most prominent junk bond purchasers are institutions such as in-
surance companies and thrifts.6 The restrictions on these institutions'
ability to purchase and hold junk bonds, combined with a series of de-
faults on major junk bond issues,' issuers' difficulty in making interest
payments on other issues,8 and the failure of a preeminent market maker
for junk bonds,9 have reduced the liquidity of outstanding junk bond is-
sues and made the issuance of new junk bonds far more difficult.10 More-
over, some prominent junk bond issuers, attempting to reduce the costs
and risks large junk bond issues impose, have sought to exchange them
bonds pose risks to purchasers because of the bonds' high default risk. The risks to issuers also
impose greater risks on holders of senior securities in the issuers, raising more general questions as to
bondholders' rights in the law of corporate governance. See, eg., William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate
Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time ofRestructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92 [hereinafter Corpo-
rate Debt Relationships]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1990) [hereinafter Unstable Coalitions].
3. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1989)).
4. FIRREA § 222, adding § 28(d) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
§ 1831e(d) (1989)).
5. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners is considering measures that would
limit amounts of junk bonds that insurers can hold. Such measures also would require them to
maintain higher reserves for their junk bond holdings. Gary Hector, Junk's Bad Times are Just
Starting, FORTUNE, June 4, 1990, at 81, 84.
6. William W. Barker, The Federal Reserve and Junk Bond Financing: Anomaly or Inconven-
ience?, 19 PAc. L.J. 769, 782 (1988).
7. Almost six percent of outstanding junk bond issuers defaulted in 1989. Industry specialists
estimate that the 1990 default rate could exceed 10%. Hector, supra note 5, at 82-84. By the middle
of 1990, about 8,400 junk bond issues had defaulted, and other issuers were seeking to reduce their
obligations by exchange offers for outstanding junk bond issues. See Andrew Laurance Bab, Note,
Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion, 91 COLUM. L. Rav. 846, 847-48 (1991).
8. See, eg., Junk's House of Cards, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1990, at 83-84.
9. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. filed a Chapter II bankruptcy petition on February
13, 1990. See Kurt Eichenwald, Drexel, Symbol of Wall St. Era, Is Dismantling; Bankruptcy Filed,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1990, at Al; Floyd Norris, At the 'unk Bond" Banquet, The Host Is Suddenly
Absent, id.
10. See, e g., Mathew Winkler, Junk Market's Worst-Ever Shakeout Continues With More Price
Drops, Issue-Liquidity Problems, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 1989, at Cl. Market liquidity is so low that
junk bond issuers increasingly prefer the private placement market to public registration of new
issues and offer incentives-such as options-to buyers to acquire significant shares of the issuers'
stock. WALL ST. J., May 23, 1990, at Cl.
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for cash and other securities."' Nonetheless, companies are still issuing
new junk bonds, albeit in sharply reduced volume, and over $120 billion
worth of junk bonds remains outstanding. 2 Their status will affect not
only individual purchasers but also major institutional holders, which in
some cases are themselves in frail health."' It is therefore important to
consider, before the deluge, how to deal with junk bonds in bankruptcy.
"Junk bonds," as used in the popular press, generically describes in-
struments, issued as corporate debt, that do not receive an investment-
grade rating from at least one major rating agency."' Generally an in-
strument's failure to receive such a rating indicates that it represents
higher risks, in terms of timely payment of both interest and principal,
than does an instrument that is rated. This Article argues that, in some
cases, the risks are such that they more closely resemble equity invest-
ments than true debt. Consequently, in the bankruptcies of junk bond
issuers, bankruptcy law policies should treat junk bond holders as equity
investors rather than as creditors. Treatment of this kind will signifi-
cantly affect junk bond holders as well as holders of senior debt to whom
the junk bond issues are subordinated, holders who otherwise would re-
ceive "double dividend" payments from junk bond holders.' 5 Moreover,
treatment of junk bonds as equity will strongly affect other aspects of
bankruptcy cases involving junk bond issuers, such as fraudulent transfer
litigation arising from failed leveraged buyouts.1 6
It is noteworthy that the failure to receive investment-grade ratings
results from junk bond characteristics that vary substantially from one
security to another.' Since junk bonds are not all alike, it would be
neither wise nor fair for bankruptcy courts to treat them all similarly.
11. See, eg., David Gillen, Bond Prices Finish Dull Session Flat With Dealers Starved for Qual-
ity Paper, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 30, 1991, at 3 (RJR Nabisco Inc. offered to exchange $465 cash
and 110 shares of its common stock for each $1,000 face amount of its subordinated debentures due
in 2007); Vineeta Anand, Junk Bond Holders' Plea For Help Clouds Refinancing, INVEsTOR'S
DAILY, Jan. 31, 1991, at 8 (junk bond holders ask for federal protection against abusive exchange
offers for their securities). For a discussion of the effects of exchange offers on the analysis of junk
bond issues, see infra Section V.C.
12. See Hector, supra note 5, at 81 (though outstanding junk is hard to price because many
issues do not regularly trade, total outstanding value is estimated at $120-160 billion).
13. Id.
14. See infra note 19.
15. See infra Sections II.Al.a. and V.A.2.
16. See infra Section VI.
17. See infra Section V.A. for characteristics which appear, in varying mixtures, in different
junk bond issues.
1991] 1141
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Therefore, one of this Article's major goals is to provide a guide for the
reader to those junk bonds with characteristics that may warrant special
treatment in the event of an issuer's bankruptcy.
Section I defines, for purposes of this Article, the broad class of instru-
ments called "junk bonds." Section II then describes the debt/equity
classification problem and why it now assumes importance in the bank-
ruptcy arena. Section III discusses the sources of authority enabling
bankruptcy courts to recharacterize junk bonds as equity when appropri-
ate. Section IV analyzes the theoretical bases for categorizing junk
bonds. Section V provides a road map through the maze of junk bond
features, describing those characteristics whose presence or absence in a
particular issue will help determine how bankruptcy should deal with
such an issue. Finally, Section VI discusses important related problems
in dealing with junk bond issues in bankruptcy, including the ways in
which the debt/equity issue may provide a new viewpoint on challenges
to leveraged buyouts under fraudulent transfer law.
I. DEFINITION
What are junk bonds? Most generally, junk bonds are securities, de-
nominated as corporate debt,"8 that credit evaluation agencies such as
Moody's and Standard & Poor's either have not rated or have rated at
less than investment grade.' 9 They include both "fallen angels," corpo-
18. Corporate finance terminology customarily has divided debt securities into "bonds," "de-
bentures," and "notes." Bonds are long-term debt secured by property of the issuer and issued
subject to covenants contained in an indenture. Debentures are long-term (usually with maturities in
excess of ten years) unsecured obligations of the issuer, also subject to an indenture. Notes are
shorter-term debt securities, usually unsecured, and usually issued without a formal indenture. See
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 216 (4th ed. 1990); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN ALEXANDER, LAWS OF COR-
PORATIONS at 385-90 (3d ed. 1983); Frank J. Fabozzi & Harry C. Sauvain, Corporate Bonds, in
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, OPTIONS AND FUTURES 290, 299 (Frank J.
Fabozzi & Frank G. Zarb eds., 2d ed. 1986); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders,
13 J. CORP. L. 205, 249 (1988) [hereinafter Bondholders and Stockholders]; The Cooper Cos., Inc.,
senior extendible notes, 79 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY 4338-39 (1987) (notes with five-year maturity);
Seminole Kraft Corp., senior extendible notes, 79 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY 5203-04 (1987) (notes
with 12-year maturity). Regardless of where debt securities fall in this traditional classification, all
can be, and will be for this Article's purposes, described as "junk bonds" if unrated or rated at less
than investment grade.
19. Standard & Poor's ("S & P") and Moody's are the two most prominent credit rating agen-
cies. Such agencies study the quality of debt issues based on the issuer's ability to repay interest and
principal. Issuers' ability to pay turns on both the issuer's financial health and the agencies' evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of protective provisions in the contracts creating the debt. For long-term
debt, S & P gives its highest rating, "AAA," to those issues whose issuers have the highest ability to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/6
1991] JUNK BONDS IN BANKRUPTCY 1143
rate bonds initially issued with investment-grade ratings that have lost
those ratings because of changed circumstances affecting their issuers, 0
and corporate securities originally issued as junk bonds.
Junk bonds have always been with us in one form or another.21 In the
early 1980s, however, corporate financiers discovered junk bonds as a
means of capitalizing business organizations that previously had little ac-
cess to the securities markets for raising cash.2 Junk bonds issued in the
early 1980s for this purpose generally have few of the characteristics that
raise questions as to their proper treatment in bankruptcy."
Beginning in about 1983, investment bankers discovered 4 that junk
bonds were enormously useful for financing takeovers and other forms of
corporate restructuring. 25 At that time, the size of junk bond issues be-
gan to grow dramatically, and issuers added features to junk bonds that
pay interest and principal according to the terms of the investment contract; Moody's corresponding
rating is "Aaa." S & P's ratings range from this highest level down to "D," which it gives to bonds
actually in default. Moody's and S & P consider issues rated from "BBB" (corresponding to
Moody's "Baa") through "AAA" to be "investment grade;" these issues possess strong capacity for
repayment of interest and principal. The issues that both agencies rate below that level ("BB" and
below in the S & P system, and "Ba," and below in the Moody's system), are considered speculative
to varying degrees. See Charles G. Phillips, High-Yield Securities, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 71, 72 (Stephen J. Friedman et al. eds, 1986); SUBCOMM. ON TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, 99TH CONG. lST SEss., REPORT ON THE ROLE OF HIGH YIELD BONDS IN CAPITAL
MARKETS AND CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1-2, 4-7 (Comm. Print
1985) [hereinafter REPORT]; Kenneth Lehn et al., The Economics of Leveraged Takeovers, 65 WASH.
U. L.Q. 163, 163-64 (1987); Michael D. Floyd, Comment, Junk Bonds: Do They Have Value? 35
EMORY L.J. 921, 922-24 (1986).
20. See infra Section V.B.
21. Original issue junk bonds (as opposed to down-graded bonds originally issued with invest-
ment-grade ratings) were rare, however, prior to 1977. Paul Asquith et al., Original Issue High Yield
Bonds: Aging Analyses of Defaults, Exchanges, and Calls, 44 J. FIN. 923, 926 (1989); Robert A.
Taggart, Jr., The Growth of the "Junk" Bond Market and Its Role In Financing Takeovers, in
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 5, 8 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
22. Out of approximately 23,000 U.S. corporations with annual sales over $35,000,000, only
about 2,000 are able to issue investment-grade debt securities. Surviving the Drexel Whirlwind, THE
ECONOMIST, March 24, 1990, at 69. See also Taggart, supra note 21, at 8.
23. See infra Section V.
24. The discovery is normally credited to Drexel Burnham Lambert. See CONNIE BRUCK, THE
PREDATORS' BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE RISE OF THE JUNK
BOND RAIDERS 105-265 (rev. ed. 1989).
25. Of the approximately $187 billion worth of junk bonds issued from 1983 through 1989,
roughly 25% was used to finance leveraged buy-out debt. Of Raiders, Revving-up and Leverage, in
Survey on Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, May 5, 1990, at 12. Critics of the late 1980s corporate
takeover wave assert that junk bonds helped make takeovers too easy for would-be acquirors. Evi-
dence suggests that the importance of junk bonds in merger and acquisition activity tends to increase
with the size of the deal. Barker, supra note 6, at 772-73; REPORT, supra note 19, at 3, 23. See also
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raise questions as to the bonds' appropriate status in bankruptcy.26
This Article will use the term "junk bonds" in its most general sense:
all securities labelled debt that neither major rating agency rated or that
both agencies rated at below investment grade. This broad definition
permits us to consider virtually all securities popularly included under
the "junk bond" label. It should be stressed, however, that many very
different kinds of instruments fit under this broad description, and, hav-
ing assembled them into this broad class, we must subdivide them ac-
cording to origin, structure, and function, in order to deal with their
proper treatment in bankruptcy.
II. JUNK BONDS AND THE DEBT/EQUITY PROBLEM
IN BANKRUPTCY
Junk bonds, by the label that the market gives them and by the lan-
guage of the documents that create them, purport to be debt instruments.
Why, then, should a bankruptcy court consider treating them as qualita-
tively different from other debt? The answer is that, at least for some
junk bonds, the "debt" label may not be accurate. Instead, junk bonds
with certain characteristics may deserve the label that THE ECONOMIST
has applied to junk bonds in general: "a brand of quasi-equity in the
sense that, unlike conventional bonds, they are less a bet on interest rates
"127than on a given company's earning power...
While THE ECONOMIST'S characterization of junk bonds in general as
"quasi-equity" appears too broad, observers and participants in the junk
bond market have noted the often strong resemblance of junk bonds to
equity.2" Albert M. Wojnilower, a leading economist and a managing
director of the First Boston Corporation, a major investment banking
firm, told a 1989 conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston that ". .. junk bonds ... are just equity camouflaged to deceive
the Internal Revenue Service."' 29 Similarly, David Schulte, managing
Taggart, supra note 21, at 13-15; Floyd, supra note 19 at 944-50 (junk bonds raise the number of
potential bidders for a corporate target); BRUCK, supra note 24, at 95-148.
26. See infra Section V.
27. Junk bonds: Last Resorts, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989, at 75.
28. As this Article indicates, many characteristics of particular junk bond issues may support
their recharacterization as equity, consistent both with the views quoted here and with substantial
anecdotal evidence. Systematic empirical studies of the behavior of junk bonds with equity charac-
teristics also are needed to further this analysis. See, e.g., Philip Shuchman, Theory and Reality in
Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS 66 (1977).
29. Albert M. Wojnilower, Discussion [of Richard W. Kopcke & Eric S. Rosengren, Regulation
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partner of the investment firm of Chilmark Partners, has described junk
bonds as "equity with a bow-tie."'3 In a study of junk bonds made prior
to the 1989 decline of the junk bond market, Richard A. Booth con-
cluded that, in the takeover context, investors found junk bonds appeal-
ing because they represented a way to recover distributions that, absent
takeover, target companies were not making and that ordinarily would
take the form of common stock dividends.31 In this view, junk bonds
perform a function more normally performed by equity securities.
If at least some junk bonds are "quasi-equity," a court considering
their status in an issuer's bankruptcy must determine whether their
"debt" label is accurate and fair to third-party creditors. If their equity
characteristics outweigh their debt features, and if treating them as debt
would be unfair to third-party creditors, a bankruptcy court will need to
consider whether junk bond holders' claims should be allowed as debt. If
not, the court may decide to reclassify them as equity, or at least equita-
bly to subordinate them to the claims of those competing creditors who
otherwise would suffer unfair treatment.32
A. The Nature of the Debt/Equity Problem
In bankruptcy, the distinction between debt and equity long has been
important. The Bankruptcy Code itself follows traditional bankruptcy
law in making this distinction. It broadly divides securities that a
debtor3 issues into "claims," debt instruments that give their holders
creditor status, and "interests," equity securities giving their holders the
of Debt and Equity], in ARE THE DIsTINCTioNs BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY DISAPPEARING?
(hereinafter "DISTINCTIONS") (Proceedings of conference held at Melvin Village, N.H., 10/89, spon-
sored by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, R. Kopcke & E. Rosengrin, eds.), 212, 215.
30. Roger Lowenstein, Rise of a Junk Play: Betting on Equity, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1990, at
Cl. See also Lee A. Sheppard, Should Junk Bond Interest Deductions Be Disallowed? 34 TAx
NOTES 1142, 1143 (1987) ("In moments of weakness.. .investment bankers will admit that junk debt
is really disguised equity").
31. Richard A. Booth, Junk Bonds, The Relevance of Dividends and the Limits of Managerial
Discretion, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 553, 556-57 ("Junk bonds are not really riskier bonds, but
rather are stock which includes a promise to pay"). See also Harold Bierman, Jr., Debt, Stock and
Junk Bonds, 41 TAX NOTES 1237, 1238 (1988) (Junk bonds have significant equity characteristics,
especially when the bonds include features such as convertibility); Bondholders and Stockholders,
supra note 18, at 252 (some security analysts see junk bonds "as a type of equity security");
MICHAEL M. LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL STREET 216-17
(1989) (junk bonds behave more like equity than traditional corporate bonds).
32. See IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1957); Asa S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel,
The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 94-95 (1961).
33. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a "debtor" is a person, including a corporation, who has filed
1991] 1145
Washington University Open Scholarship
1146 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:1137
rights of owners of equity in the debtor.34 The Code does not, however,
provide any more detailed guidance on how to classify an instrument
whose underlying characteristics make the debt/equity choice uncertain.
No bankruptcy case has yet addressed the issue of whether publicly held
securities sold as debt actually constitute equity. The rights of creditors
and equity holders in bankruptcy differ so much, however, that we can
expect this issue to emerge in cases concerning securities bearing both
debt and equity features, such as junk bonds.
B. The Importance of the Debt/Equity Issue in the Bankruptcy
Context
Parties always have been free to characterize their relationships. Fol-
lowing bankruptcy policy, courts normally have enforced the relation-
ships that investors and business organizations enter into according to
the terms of the instruments creating the investment relationships. 35
Why, then, does it matter that a relationship that a debtor and its inves-
tors labelled "debt" may really be equity? Does it, for example, make
any difference whether we characterize an instrument labelled
"subordinated debt" as debt or equity, as long as the subordination is
enforced?
In fact, significant policies in bankruptcy and related bodies of law
make the distinction between debt and equity important.
L Bankruptcy Policies
a. Distributions
One of the strongest policies of bankruptcy law is that, except for se-
cured claims and claims granted special statutory priority, all creditors
must be paid on a pro rata basis. 36 Furthermore, the bankruptcy estate
must pay all creditors fully before making any payment to holders of
equity interests.37 This policy is based on a long history. Creditors al-
a bankruptcy petition or against whom creditors have filed an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(13) (West Supp. 1991). Unless otherwise noted, this Article uses the term in this sense.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
35. See, eg., 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1988) (bankruptcy courts will normally enforce subordination
agreements parties create outside of bankruptcy); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
36. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2262-63 (1990) (equality of distribution among creditors is a
central Bankruptcy Code policy and requires pro rata distribution of debtor's property among credi-
tors of the same class).
37. 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1129(b) (1988); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215,
219 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 113-120 (1939).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/6
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ways have expected payment ahead of equity holders. Equity holders,
for their part, expect to collect after creditors on insolvency. In return,
they are entitled to the residual portion of the debtor's profits and prop-
erty.38 It is only fair to enforce such traditional and legitimate expecta-
tions as to how bankruptcy will treat claims against and interests in a
debtor.
If a junk bond issue is in fact equity, the use of the "debt" label should
not be permitted to distort this process.39  In most bankruptcy cases,
whether Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, the property of the estate will not
suffice to pay general unsecured creditors in full.' If forced to share
simply because equity holders' claims have been labelled "debt," 41 genu-
ine creditors will receive less than the "fair and equitable"'42 distribution
to which the law entitles them.
The situation becomes more complicated if the junk bond issue in
question is contractually subordinated to certain senior debt. Agree-
ments normally accomplish subordination of this type and, on default of
the issuer, require that the holders of subordinated securities turn over
any payment made to them to the holders of the senior debt, until the
latter's claims are paid in full.43 Such "double dividends" substantially
increase the proportion of the senior creditors' claims against an insol-
vent debtor that will be repaid; the subordinated debt normally will en-
able them to receive proportionately more than other unsecured
creditors.
38. See infra section V.A.l.
39. See IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1957) (claim arising from what purported
to be a loan, but which was actually "investment of risk capital," should not be allowed to prejudice
claims of general creditors).
40. See, e-g., Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 85-86.
41. Such sharing not only would be contrary to the normal order of distribution in bankruptcy,
but could result in a windfall for junk bond holders resulting from the fact of bankruptcy. For
example, the junk bond instruments might not provide default remedies that would, outside of bank-
ruptcy, enable holders to compete with third-party creditors. See infra Section V.A.3.n. Yet, if such
instruments are neither reclassified nor otherwise subordinated, they will share pro rata with third-
party creditors as a result of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy should not, absent special reasons central to
the bankruptcy process itself, change nonbankruptcy entitlements in this way. See Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). See generally, Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitle-
ments, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott,
On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA.
L. REV. 155 (1989); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. at 115-117
("fair and equitable" is a term of art requiring absolute priority for creditors over equity holders); In
re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935).
43. See Dee Martin Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 YALE L.J. 376, 379 (1961).
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If the "subordinated debt" is really an equity interest in the issuer,
then the senior creditors should not be entitled to receive "double divi-
dend" payments of this kind. Moreover, any distributions that
"subordinated debt" holders receive will be more than they are entitled
to. In this situation they should be subordinated to all third-party credi-
tors as well as to the senior debt holders.45
b. Dealing With Secured Claims
The Bankruptcy Code respects properly perfected security interests in
either personal or real property. When a valid lien secures a creditor's
claim, the claim must be paid in full before any of the property's residual
value may be applied to the claims of other creditors.a6 In other words,
unsecured creditors' claims are paid last, out of assets remaining in the
estate after all secured claims are paid, and after other claims to which
the Code gives special priorities47 have been satisfied. 8 Thus, a secured
creditor is likely to recover substantially more than an unsecured
creditor.
Assets of the issuer usually do not secure junk bonds.a9 Indeed, be-
cause security interests make payment of an underlying debt more cer-
tain, rating agencies are less likely to view secured instruments as junk
bonds in the first place. Even if rated as junk, courts are unlikely to
recharacterize secured bonds as equity.5 0
A junk bond issue could, however, purport to be secured by property
of the issuer.51 A deeply subordinated issue52 could, because of its multi-
ple subordination, have prospects of repayment sufficiently speculative to
fall into the junk bond category. If the speculative aspects of such an
instrument suffice to make it equity, then it is questionable whether the
instrument represents the kind of obligation required to support a secur-
ity interest under the Uniform Commercial Code;53 it is, at least, doubt-
44. Assuming that third-party creditors receive less than 100% of the amounts owed to them.
45. See infra section V.A.2.
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
47. See I 1 U.S.C.A. § 507 (1988 & West Supp. 1991) for special priorities the Bankruptcy Code
creates.
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
49. See STANLEY F. REED, LANE & EDSON, P.C., THE ART or M & A: A MERGER/ACQUISI-
TIoN/BUYOUT GUIDE 159 (1989).
50. See infra Section V.A.3.i.
51. See REED, supra note 49, at 159.
52. See infra Section V.A.2.d.
53. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-203(b) (1991).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/6
JUNK BONDS IN BANKRUPTCY
ful that a secured equity interest should receive priority over the claims
of genuine creditors, secured or unsecured, as the Bankruptcy Code's
scheme of distribution requires.54
c. Committee Representation
Creditors' committees play a major role in bankruptcy reorganization.
The United States Trustee must appoint a committee of unsecured credi-
tors as soon as possible after the debtor files a bankruptcy petition. Fur-
thermore, the United States Trustee may appoint additional
committees-for instance, creditors with special interests or equity inter-
est holders-if such appointments are appropriate or if the bankruptcy
court so orders. 55
The Bankruptcy Code charges creditors' committees with representing
creditors or interest holders (if the court orders recognition of an equity
committee) in negotiating, with the debtor's management, a plan of reor-
ganization.56 If, however, a creditors' committee includes holders of a
junk bond issue, when that issue in fact constitutes equity, the represen-
tation may be inappropriate and may distort the formulation of a plan.57
d. Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions
Another significant policy concern addresses the initiation of a bank-
ruptcy case. Although most U.S. bankruptcy cases are voluntary, 58 i.e.,
initiated by the debtor itself, creditors have the right to commence an
involuntary case against a debtor if certain conditions are met. This right
belongs only to creditors, and not to persons holding equity interests in
the debtor.59
54. See Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 500, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1941) (deed of trust and pursu-
ant foreclosure sale invalidated because purported debt that deed of trust secured actually consti-
tuted equity and therefore could not be secured against bona fide creditors).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988).
57. This does not mean that the issue of categorizing a particular junk bond issue need be
litigated at the outset of a bankruptcy case. The bankruptcy court instead could designate a separate
committee to represent the holders of junk bonds that are subject to challenge. 11 U.S.C.
§ I102(a)(2) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 55.
58. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDI-
TORS, at 409-10 (2d ed. 1991).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988) (to initiate case against a debtor petitioners must hold claims
against the debtor).
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e. Voting Rights
Creditors and equity holders have important and significantly different
voting rights in bankruptcy.
In a Chapter 7 case, unsecured creditors holding allowable, liquidated,
and undisputed claims are entitled to vote for the election of a permanent
trustee for the debtor. Equity holders have no similar role in the trustee's
selection.'
In Chapter 11 cases, voting rights are substantially more important,
and considerably more complex. Each class of creditors and interest
holders must vote on a plan of reorganization before the bankruptcy
court can confirm it.6" The requirements for class approval are different
for creditors and interest holders. At least half of the members of each
creditor class, and holders of at least two-thirds of the amount of that
class's allowed claims must vote for the plan in order for the class to
approve. Interest-holder acceptance requires that two-thirds of the total
allowed interests vote to approve the plan.62
A bankruptcy court considering the claims of junk bond holders,
therefore, may not completely avoid voting distortion merely by treating
the claims as separate from the claims of other creditor classes. The
problem instead results from classifying them as creditors in the first
place, when it would be more appropriate to deal with them as equity
holders.
2. Other Creditors' Rights Policies
In addition to bankruptcy law, other bodies of law give creditors cer-
tain rights adjudicated in bankruptcy. These are predominantly state
laws. Correct characterization of investment instruments may be impor-
tant in vindicating the policies of such laws in the bankruptcy context.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). See In re St. Charles Preservation Investors, Ltd., 112 B.R. 469
(D.D.C. 1990), in which the terms of a limited partnership agreement entitled the limited partners to
"guaranteed payments" consisting of repayment of their investment and "interest." The bankruptcy
court correctly held that, despite the "guaranteed payment" label, the limited partners' interests
were equity, and they were therefore not entitled to vote for the Chapter 7 trustee. The district court
reversed, primarily on the strength of the label, and without any real analysis of the nature of the
limited partners' interests. The court misused the term "security interest" in attempting to describe
their interests. The court held that the limited partners had both equity interests and creditors'
claims and could vote for the trustee based on the latter.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988).
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a. Creditors' Rights Under Corporate Law
One such body of law is corporate law.63 The development of the junk
bond market implicates corporate law policies in several ways. Although
corporate law traditionally has offered little protection to creditors, it has
provided some, notably by restraining distributions to equity holders. A
corporation may not, under most state corporation statutes, distribute
assets to shareholders: 1) while insolvent; 2) if such distribution would
make the corporation insolvent;" or 3) out of the corporation's stated
capital.65
If a junk bond issue is in fact disguised equity, mere use of the "debt"
label should not help the issue evade state-law restraints. In Chapter 7
liquidations, the trustee may recover pre-bankruptcy distributions made
in violation of such restraints for the benefit of creditors. In Chapter 11
reorganizations, the debtor-in-possession, or a creditors' committee act-
ing with authorization from the bankruptcy court may make such a
recovery.
66
Moreover, recharacterization of a junk bond issue as equity may enti-
tle its holders to some of the protections that corporate law offers to
shareholders, both in and out of bankruptcy.
67
b. Fraudulent Transfer Law
Fraudulent transfer laws protect creditors both in and out of bank-
ruptcy. Broadly speaking, these laws prevent an insolvent debtor from
transferring property otherwise available to satisfy creditors' claims, un-
less the transfer is made in exchange for property roughly equivalent in
value to the transferred property.68 The fraudulent transfer laws protect
63. See infra Section VI.D.
64. Corporate law normally defines solvency in the equity rather than the bankruptcy sense. A
debtor is equity insolvent if it cannot pay its debts as they come due. See BAYLESS MANNING &
JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 63 (3d ed. 1990).
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 154, 170-174, 244 (1983 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 506, 510 (McKinney 1986); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.40 (1984);
MANNING & HANKS, supra note 64, at 63-69.
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) (giving the trustee power to avoid any of the debtor's pre-
bankruptcy transfers that a creditor could avoid under applicable non-bankruptcy law); Arnold v.
Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502 (5th Cir. 1941).
67. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 667 [hereinafter Convertible Bonds] (fiduciary duties due equity holders may be an
important way to protect convertible bond holders against unfair treatment by issuers'
management).
68. See infra Section VI.B.
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creditors only,69 and it is therefore important for the enforcement of
these laws, both in and out of bankruptcy, to identify legitimate
creditors.7°
Fraudulent transfer issues are especially likely to come up in bank-
ruptcy when the debtor's financial plight results from a failed leveraged
buyout (LBO).71 Junk bonds came to play a particularly important role
in LBOs as the LBO movement reached its climax in the late 1980s.12
Whether the junk bonds issued in a particular LBO constitute debt or
equity thus may be a key issue in the fraudulent transfer litigation likely
to follow from the issuer's bankruptcy.73
III. THE ROLE OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT: AUTHORITY TO
CLASSIFY "JUNK BONDS"
Bankruptcy law gives a court substantial authority to recharacterize a
junk bond issue if features of the instruments creating it and the circum-
stances of its issue indicate that the court should treat it as equity rather
than debt.
A. Equitable Subordination Under Bankruptcy Code Section 510(c)
One way in which to recharacterize purported debt securities as equity
is to label the recharacterization equitable subordination, a classic equita-
ble doctrine adopted in Bankruptcy Code section 510(c). The bank-
ruptcy court has broad discretion to decide whether to subordinate the
claims of a creditor or group of creditors to the claims of other creditors
in order to achieve equity.74 Courts have used equitable subordination
69. See, eg., UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-10 (1918); UNIFORM FRAUDU-
LENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4-5, 7 (1984).
70. Moreover, whether a given transaction is subject to attack under fraudulent transfer law
may depend on whether the debtor was solvent at the time of the transfer or was rendered insolvent
by it. Whether a debtor is solvent for fraudulent transfer purposes may in turn depend on whether
junk bonds the debtor issued are characterized as debt or equity. See infra Section VI.B. 1.
71. See, e-g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Wieboldt Stores, Inc.
v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp.
175 (S.D. Cal. 1985); In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc., 100 B.R. 127, 134-41 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1989); In re Morse Tool, Inc., 108 B.R. 389, 390-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Ohio Corrugating Co.
v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
72. See supra note 25; REED supra note 49, at 116-119.
73. See infra Section VI.B.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1988); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219
(1941) ("The power of the bankruptcy court to subordinate claims or to adjudicate equities arising
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more than any other doctrine to deal with purported debt that has equity
characteristics. This application of equitable subordination includes
those cases in which "creditors" acquired claims labelled debt in pre-
bankruptcy exchanges for equity instruments.75
In the absence of a pre-bankruptcy exchange, however, certain charac-
teristics of equitable subordination may make the doctrine inappropriate
for use in the recharacterization of most junk bonds. Courts normally
use the doctrine to prevent creditor (usually insider) overreaching at the
expense of less favorably placed creditors.7 6 Under the doctrine, a court
subordinates the claims of the overreaching creditors to the claims of
creditors injured by the overreaching. Since equity interests in a debtor
are subordinate to all creditors' claims, equitable subordination is at first
glance an effective way in which to recharacterize securities bearing the
"debt" label as equity.
Bankruptcy courts have applied equitable subordination in three kinds
of situations: 1) fraud, illegality, or breach of fiduciary duties; 2) under-
capitalization; and 3) situations that would normally justify piercing the
corporate veil, L e., situations in which a corporate entity is an instrumen-
tality or an alter ego of an affiliate.77 Junk bond issuers are often under-
capitalized. This is a significant factor in the recharacterization of
"debt" as equity for tax purposes.78 In the tax context, no proof of fraud
or illegality is required.79
Equitable subordination classically requires three elements: 1) the
out of the relationship between the several creditors is complete."); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
296, 304-07 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); In re Holiday Mart,
Inc., 715 F.2d 430, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1983); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 510.01 (15th ed. 1990);
Harry S. Gleick, Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy Under the Equitable Power of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, 16 Bus. LAW. 611, 611-12 (1961).
75. McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 367 (9th Cir. 1968); Robinson v. Wangemann,
75 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir. 1935).
76. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S.
307 (1939); In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d
692 (5th Cir. 1977); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified
Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589
(1975).
77. In re Missionary Baptist Found. of America, 712 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. See I.R.C. § 385(b)(3) (1989) (regulations concerning whether an interest in a corporation
should be treated as debt or equity for tax purposes may include issuer's debt to equity ratio as
factor); William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical
Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369, 507-19 (1971); Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of
the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 534-36 (1977).
79, Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219-20 (1941); Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1939); IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1957).
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party to be subordinated has engaged in inequitable conduct; 2) that con-
duct has injured other creditors or given the party against whom subordi-
nation is sought an unfair advantage; and 3) subordination of the claim is
consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.8 0
While courts normally recharacterize debt as equity within the frame-
work of equitable subordination,"' the recharacterization of junk bonds
does not always comfortably fit within this framework. Mislabelling eq-
uity as debt technically meets the requirements for equitable subordina-
tion enumerated above: such mislabelling is inequitable and gives an
unfair advantage to those holding the mislabelled instruments8 2 and to
those holding senior debt who will also receive more than their due share
based on subordination agreements.8 3 Nonetheless, bankruptcy courts,
which most often apply the doctrine in cases involving insider miscon-
duct, often limit its application to those cases.8 4 Because junk bond hold-
ers are not normally insiders of the issuer, the courts would be reluctant
to apply the doctrine to them. Even a large holder of privately placed
junk bonds is unlikely to be an insider, as long as the placement is negoti-
ated at arms' length and the buyer does not acquire excessive power,
through debt covenants or in the course of a working relationship, over
the issuer.85
Under certain circumstances involving large, privately placed issues,
however, a court may find that a lender is an insider because of a close
relationship between borrower and lender. In that case, the use of equi-
80. In re Missionary Baptist Found. of America, 712 F.2d at 212. Accord In re Multiponics,
Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1980). See also In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir.
1977).
81. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 93-98.
82. IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d at 184 (it would be "highly inequitable" for a parent to sharepro
rata with its subsidiaries' creditors, when its claim "represents in reality nothing but its investment
of risk capital"); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 31, at 93-98.
83. See supra Section II.b.l.a.
84. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 B.R. 274, 296-299 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1983)(bankruptcy court refused to treat purported debt as equity, stressing that "inequitable
conduct" was needed for equitable subordination).
85. See id. Another line of cases, however, holds that noninsiders' claims may be equitably
subordinated, but that subordination requires proof of more "egregious" misconduct on their part
than in cases involving insiders: conduct amounting to "fraud, overreaching, or spoliation." In re
Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 116 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); In re W. T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 74-
75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). Denominating equity interests as debt might well qualify as "overreach-
ing" for purposes of this test, if the instrument so labelled had equity characterisitics clearly out-
weighing its debt features.
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table subordination as an appropriate doctrine for reorganization may be
quite straightforward.
The fit becomes worse still when the junk bonds in question are pub-
licly held. Junk bonds' registration under the Securities Act of 1933 or
state blue sky laws may not be decisive in bankruptcy; issuers may have
designed a registered issue for a few large, institutional holders. 6 When,
however, the junk bond holders are truly public, i.e., when the securities
are dispersed among a significant number of investors of differing sophis-
tication, equitable subordination becomes much more difficult to use. If
other factors that call for recharacterization 7 still significantly outweigh
public holding, the court may need to apply other doctrines to find au-
thority for the recharacterization.
If, however, equitable subordination is available to the court, it may
have some advantages over other methods of dealing with equity-like in-
struments. Equitable subordination is a flexible doctrine that subordi-
nates debt only to the claims of creditors adversely affected by the actions
of the creditor against whom subordination is sought."8 This means that
in the junk bond context, a court could apply equitable subordination to
benefit involuntary creditors, tort claimants and the public fisc, for exam-
ple, while leaving the subordinated debt on the same level as certain
other creditors who, while not themselves subject to subordination or
reclassification, lent to the debtor knowing of the existence of the junk
bonds. Under this theory, because the junk bond issue did not disadvan-
tage these creditors, their claims should not have priority over those of
the junk bond holders.8 9 Moreover, subordination (as opposed to
recharacterization) would not have some of the other adverse effects de-
scribed below.'
B. Classification Powers of the Bankruptcy Court
The powers of the bankruptcy court to classify the claims and interests
86. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
87. See infra Section IV.B.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1988); In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 1977);
In re Slefco, 107 B.R. 628, 644 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989); David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contrac-
tual Debt Subordination and Lien Priority, 38 VAND. L. REV. 975, 989-90 (1985).
89. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 87 (subordinated creditors, despite demotion of
their claims below those of other creditors, remain creditors with the other rights of creditors such as
voting on plans of reorganization).
90. See infra Section VI.
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asserted against a debtor,91 supported by the court's general equity pow-
ers,92 appear to provide a more satisfactory basis for dealing with the
debt/equity problem in bankruptcy. A court using these powers need
not deal with the insider status of the holders of the instruments in ques-
tion, as in the case of equitable subordination. Instead, the court need
only decide: 1) that the party advocating reclassification had overcome
the normal presumption in favor of the label that the parties to the in-
strument had attached to it; 2) that the features of the instrument and the
circumstances of its issue compel a finding that its "debt" label is inap-
propriate; and 3) thtat it would be unfair to the debtors' genuine creditors
not to reclassify the intrument as equity.93
To reach such a decision, the court would have to analyze the initial
transaction carefully, based on the presence or absence of certain factors,
enumerated below,94 and on any other features that might be present. 95
The analysis should not simply compare the features of a particular deal
to a laundry list of suspect provisions, but should instead ascertain what
kind of instrument the parties intended to create.96 If the analysis shows
that the parties intended an instrument with the advantages and disad-
vantages of equity, but with a "debt" label, and that honoring the label
rather than the substance would significantly disadvantage genuine credi-
tors, the court should apply the more appropriate "equity" label.97
C. General Equitable Powers of the Court
Bankruptcy courts are primarily courts of equity.9" They derive their
equitable powers from their inherent powers as courts,9 9 from particular
policies of the bankruptcy laws, and from particular statutory grants in
91. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 1123, 1129 (1988).
92. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1123(b)(5) (1988).
93. Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1941) (purported advances to corporation
by its dominant shareholder "were capital contributions," even absent "proof of mala fides"). See
also Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 93 ("capital contribution" bankruptcy cases actually turn
on whether a debt exists, not on classic subordination analysis).
94. See infra Section V.
95. This Article begins but scarcely ends the inquiry; the creativity of investment bankers
knows no limit.
96. See Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1977).
97. See Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d at 502-03.
98. United States v. Energy Resources Co. 110 S. Ct. 2139, 2142 (1990); Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 304 (1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1934).
99. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West Supp. 1991); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994,
1003 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).
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aid of their jurisdiction. °o An important aspect of this power is the
court's authority to examine agreements between the debtor and certain
creditors to prevent unfairness to third-party creditors. A court can in-
voke its general equitable powers to support the doctrines of equitable
subordination and reclassification described above.
Moreover, a court can invoke its general equitable powers to modify
the relief described above to fit the equities of particular situations. This
modified relief could, for example, deal with certain features of a securi-
ties issue as equity rights, while continuing to treat some of the holders'
rights as debt. Thus, in a junk bond issue with conversion rights, the
court could treat the underlying bond issue as debt, while separating out
the conversion rights and treating them as independent options. While
tax law has been reluctant to engage in such separation," 1 the special
equities of bankruptcy-including the more drastic consequences to
holders-argue for attempting to do so in a bankruptcy case if feasible
and not unfair to third-party creditors.
D. Effects of Bankruptcy Code Sections 510(a) and (b)
Bankruptcy Code section 510(a) provides that a subordination agree-
ment is enforceable in bankruptcy according to its terms to the same
extent as it would be under non-bankruptcy law.102 This codifies pre-
Bankruptcy Code doctrine,"0 3 and, in the case of a junk bond issue, nor-
mally makes it difficult for holders of expressly subordinated debt to es-
cape the consequences of their agreement to subordinate their claims. It
is far less clear, however, that this provision should help senior debt
holders who attempt to enforce subordination of only impliedly
subordinated claims. 1°4
Code section 510(b) requires the subordination of a claim arising from
fraud in connection with the sale of a security to all claims or interests
that would be senior to that security.'05 The provision codifies prior case
100. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1988) (court may ap-
prove any appropriate provision in a reorganization plan consistent with the rest of the Bankruptcy
Code).
101. See Willard B. Taylor, Debt/Equity and Other Tax Distinctions: How Far Can We Go?, 62
TAXES 848, 857 (1984).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1988).
103. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (1977); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
510.01 (15th ed. 1990). See also Gleick, supra note 74.
104. See infra Section V.A.2.b.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1988).
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law that barred shareholders from bootstrapping themselves into credi-
tors' claims by claiming securities fraud in connection with the acquisi-
tion of their shares.
In the junk bond context, this will prevent junk bond holders, whose
securities have been subordinated or reclassified as equity, from restoring
themselves to general creditor status by claiming damages for securities
fraud in the offering materials for the junk bonds that they purchased.
This section will not, however, bar them from recouping their losses
against persons other than the issuer, through, for example, securities-
law actions based on preparation of materially misleading offering
materials. 106
E. Additional Sources of Law
To apply the powers discussed above in the debt/equity context, a
court must first decide whether securities with primarily equity charac-
teristics actually have been mislabelled as debt. The Bankruptcy Code
itself provides no guidance for this task. There are comparatively few
recent bankruptcy cases in which courts have dealt with the debt/equity
issue. As a result, bankruptcy courts approach the classification problem
with a relatively unsophisticated eye. A court deciding whether to re-
classify or subordinate securities thus may find it helpful to borrow cau-
tiously from the experience of courts dealing with the issue in other legal
contexts.
Tax law provides the most extensive experience of this kind. Although
the tax laws have been neither clear nor consistent when faced with
debt/equity problems, 10 7 tax courts and commentators at least have been
forced to deal at great length with the classification of financial instru-
ments as debt or equity. This experience can be quite helpful in the ab-
sence of a similar wealth of bankruptcy cases and commentary. 10 8 Tax
106. See, eg., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988); Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1991).
107. This difficulty in drawing clear debt/equity lines is illustrated by the Treasury's inability to
deal with the issue. Though authorized by I.R.C. § 385 to draft appropriate regulations, the Treas-
ury withdrew the only set it proposed, and courts continue to deal with the issue on a case-by-case
basis. See Adam 0. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in
Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 118, 118-119, 128-133 (1985); BORIS I. BITrTER & JAMES
S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.04 (5th ed.
1987). See generally William D. Andrews, The ALI Reporter's Proposals on Corporate Distributions
and Corporate Taxation With a Personal Consumption Tax, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333 (1985).
108. See, e.g., Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 95 (bankruptcy courts would do better to
[Vol. 69:1137
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law may be helpful in this context not only because it has had to deal
with the debt/equity issue in many different situations, but also because
of important similarities between tax and bankruptcy jurisprudence.
1. Applicability of Tax Doctrines
Tax and bankruptcy law have a great deal in common. In both, courts
and administrators have had to consider whether parties have attached
accurate labels to their transactions. Both employ equitable concepts to
deal with business transactions according to their economic substance,
even when the parties seek special treatment by manipulating the form of
those deals. 9
The debt/equity issue is very much this kind of issue for both legal
disciplines. Bankruptcy courts need to distinguish between debt and eq-
uity for the policy reasons described above,110 while the Internal Reve-
nue Service and tax courts need to make the distinction for different, tax-
based, policies.I" While tax authorities and bankruptcy courts have dif-
ferent reasons for the classification, the distinction is the same, and both
disciplines make it by looking through the form of a transaction to its
borrow from tax cases on the debt/equity distinction than to reason from the vague "rules of fair
play and good conscience" that many attempt to apply on the issue).
109. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572-81 (1978) (economic substance of a
transaction, rather than formal written documents that the parties prepared, should govern its tax
treatment); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (substance of a transaction, rather
than its form, should determine its tax treatment); Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561
F.2d 572, 581 (5th Cir. 1977) (parties' labels for their transactions do not guarantee appropriate tax
treatment); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968) (tax treatment of
an investment depends on its economic substance rather than the labels the parties place on it);
Plumb, supra note 78, at 405-06; Karen Nelson Moore, The Sham Transaction Doctrine: An Outmo-
ded and Unnecessary Approach to Combating Tax Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. REv. 659 (1989); Herzog &
Zweibel, supra note 32, at 94-95; Gleick, supra note 74, at 611, 620 (there is little difference between
tax and bankruptcy treatment of purported debt of undercapitalized corporations). See also Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939) (bankruptcy courts exercise their equitable powers, inter alia,
so that -substance will not give way to form"); Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 846 n.6 (9th Cir.
1988); In re Carolee's Combine, Inc., 3 B.R. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). But see In re Pacific
Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (tax authority "irrelevant" to debt/equity
classification for bankruptcy purposes); Long Island Lighting v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 B.R.
274, 296-97 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983) (although bankruptcy cases evaluate debt/equity status of a
claim "for a different purpose and [utilize] different criteria" than tax cases, tax cases defendant cited
"deserve discussion").
110. See supra Section II.
111. Important tax policies implicated by the debt/equity issue include the fact that the Internal
Revenue Code makes interest on debt deductible, while dividends on equity are not deductible. For
an extensive (though somewhat dated) description of the different ways in which tax laws treat debt
and equity, see Plumb, supra note 78, at 371-404.
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substance. Both thus can use similar analysis to determine whether a
relationship that parties have labelled "debt" actually constitutes eq-
uity. 112 Consequently, there always has been some crossover between
bankruptcy and tax jurisprudence, both in case law and in scholarly anal-
ysis. 13 In fact, the early development of the debt/equity issue in the tax
context relied in part on sources in bankruptcy law and the related law of
equity receivership, from which much of bankruptcy reorganization law
derives.1 14
Moreover, applying tax principles where appropriate, rather than de-
veloping an independent set of principles for bankruptcy purposes, will
simplify business planning and avoid some unnecessary problems. It will
enable business planners to structure transactions to satisfy a single set of
requirements, instead of forcing them to satisfy independent and possibly
inconsistent criteria for tax and bankruptcy purposes.
2. Limitations of Applying Tax Jurisprudence
Congress has not generally sought to achieve consistency between tax
and bankruptcy law, except when they interact directly, i.e., when tax
issues arise as a consequence of bankruptcy, or in the context of bank-
ruptcy cases. The courts never have held tax precedent to be controlling
for bankruptcy purposes, even in cases involving common economic is-
sues. Bankruptcy courts have been wary in applying tax principles, but
as unconventional financial instruments have increasingly come to their
attention, they have found themselves increasingly faced with tax-based
arguments. Their reaction to date has not been consistent. One case that
dealt with the characterization of original issue discount i t5 which, like
the debt/equity problem, has been extensively covered in tax but not in
112. See Jules S. Cohen, Shareholder Advancer Capital or Loans? 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259,
264-65 (1978). But see In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. at 115; Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Bokum Resources Corp., 40 B.R. at 296; In re Rego Crescent Corp., 23 B.R. 958, 962 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1982). These three cases fail to perceive that, although tax and bankruptcy make the
debt/equity distinction for different purposes, the distinction they make is the same, and should
therefore follow a similar analysis. They also fail to note previous cases in which tax courts relied on
bankruptcy authority and vice versa in making the distinction. See infra note 114.
113. See, eg., Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 31, at 94-95; Sheppard, supra note 30, at 1146
(arguing for applicability of bankruptcy doctrine in characterizing junk bonds as equity for tax
purposes).
114. See Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1935) (citing Hazel
Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves, 8 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1925) (receivership) and In re Culbert-
son's, 54 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1932) (bankruptcy)); Plumb, supra note 75, at 428-29.
115. See infra Section VI.A.
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bankruptcy, held that tax law was "instructive, but not controlling" for
bankruptcy purposes.11 6 The bankruptcy court in that case nonetheless
relied extensively on tax statutes, their legislative history, Treasury regu-
lations, and tax cases in dealing with original issue discount for bank-
ruptcy purposes. Nonetheless, the court held that, based on its
interpretation of a particular Bankruptcy Code provision, it should use
different principles in calculating the amount of original issue dis-
count.' 1 7 In a related case, a bankruptcy court relied on tax law to actu-
ally calculate original issue discount for bankruptcy purposes.1 18 More
recently, a district court, without explanation, applied tax law in holding
in a reorganization case that no original issue discount had been created
in a pre-bankruptcy exchange offer.11 9
In determining whether to borrow from tax experience, a bankruptcy
court should consider the derivation of tax principle that the court may
apply. Is it principally a revenue-related purpose, a quirk in tax law not
related to the economic characterization of a transaction, or is it a char-
acterization rule developed as to aid in ascertaining the economic sub-
stance of a given transaction? If the latter, borrowing from principles
developed in the tax context for use in a bankruptcy case will be entirely
appropriate. In the former cases, the borrowing, if at all possible, will
have to be done cautiously.
This Article, in developing its analysis of the debt/equity issue for
bankruptcy purposes, will borrow from tax jurisprudence where appro-
priate, according to the principles set forth above.
IV. KEY ISSUES IN CHARACTERIZING JUNK BONDS
Despite the broad use of the "junk bond" label, bonds fail to receive
investment-grade ratings, and are thus labelled as "junk," for a wide vari-
ety of reasons. The label itself merely means that "junk" securities are
riskier than investment-grade corporate debt. Without more, riskiness is
116. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247, 251, 253 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). See also In re
Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. 51, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (tax rules for accruing original issue
discount "instructive" but not "dispositive"), aff'd, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10059 (S.D.N.Y. July
23, 1991).
117. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B. R. at 251-55 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code § 502(b)(2)
(1988)).
118. In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. at 57-58.
119. See In re Pengo Indus., Inc., 129 B.R. 104, 108-09 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (applying CIR v.
National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974), without discussing appropriate-
ness of applying tax law in the bankruptcy context).
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not sufficient reason to reclassify these securities. The common stock of
some issuers may be a safer investment than the debt of others, without
changing the characterization of either. 1 0 Whether recharacterization is
appropriate should depend more on the status of a given instrument
within the capital structure of the issuer than on its risk status in the
external market. If an issuer sells an instrument and investors buy it
with the expectation that it will perform equity-type functions for the
issuer and the holders, a bankruptcy court should look to the characteris-
tics of the instrument, and to its place in the capital structure of the
issuer, to see whether it has been correctly labelled as debt. The "junk"
label should not, by itself, overcome the normal presumption that bank-
ruptcy courts will enforce contracts that are valid under non-bankruptcy
law. 121
Whether a challenge to the "debt" label on a particular instrument
should overcome that presumption thus depends not on its failure to re-
ceive an investment grade rating, but on the reasons for that failure.
Such a challenge must rest on particular features of the issue in question,
including the circumstances of issue, the contractual features of the in-
vestment agreement creating the issue, and other reasons, such as partic-
ular characteristics of the issuer.
A. Criteria for Classification
1. Residual or Creditor-Type Claim?
One of the central bases for characterizing a security as debt or equity
is whether it primarily represents a creditor-type claim, or a residual
claim on the profits and assets of the corporation.1 22 A debt claim, for
payment of interest and principal in preset amounts on certain fixed
dates, is paid out of the debtor's available assets. A creditor, in agreeing
to such a contract with the debtor, bargains for certainty rather than for
an "upside." 2 ' Management has no discretion to vary payments of in-
120. See Emmerich, supra note 107, at 122-24.
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988) (claims in bankruptcy are deemed allowed unless a party in
interest objects). See also Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d at 13.
122. See In re Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.,
concurring) (shareholders and creditors of a corporation take different risks: the former "stand to
lose first, but in return they have all the winnings above the creditors' interest, if the venture is
successful"); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 18, at 1.
123. See Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d at 12 (creditor is paid independently of
risk of success); Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 581 (5th Cir. 1977)
(because a lender seeks only a fixed interest rate, it will not normally be willing to bear a substantial
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terest and principal on such claims. Indeed, any such variation would
result in a default. In fact, because the creditors' claims reduce the
amount available for distribution to equity holders, to whom manage-
ment owes its primary duties, creditors try to restrict management's free-
dom to undertake activities that could increase profits available for
distribution to equity.
124
A residual claim, on the other hand, is highly variable, depends pri-
marily on the profits of the debtor, and is paid after the claims of true
creditors have been met. 125 An equity investor, in establishing a residual
claim, primarily bargains for a potential upside rather than for certain
return of principal and interest. 126 Such an upside, contingent on profits
derived from the success of the issuer's business, is not paid unless the
issuer's management so authorizes. 127 The more discretion the issuer's
management has over distributions, the closer the underlying security
approaches the equity paradigm.
2. Fairness to Other Creditors
Fairness to third-party creditors is a matter of central concern in the
bankruptcy process. 121 Ay "party in interest"-a term that includes all
creditors and holders of interests in a debtor-has the right to object to
any claim. 129  A bankruptcy court, in deciding how to treat creditors'
claims against the debtor, must consider how its finding will affect all
other creditors. This represents one of the few important areas in which
nsk of corporate failure); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CmL L. REV. 89, 91 (1985) (creditors are risk-averse and accept a lower return in
exchange for greater certainty, which they receive because stockholders are wiped out first). See also
John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy-Allo-
cating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 286-87 (1973). One can argue further that the ultimate creditor paradigm, the
involuntary creditor, has no intention of making any sort of investment in the debtor, but merely
wishes to be repaid on the principal amount of his or her claim as expeditiously as possible.
124. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 833-34 (1985).
125. See Lehn, supra note 19, at 173.
126. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968); Commissioner
v O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d at 12.
127. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 506, 510, 513, 516, 719 (McKinneys 1986 & Supp.
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170-74 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
128. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. at 304, 306-309; In re Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167 F.2d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1948).
See also THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 21-27 (1986).
129. 1 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
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the rationale for recharacterization in bankruptcy potentially diverges
from the rationale for recharacterization in the tax context, where the
court must consider the interest of only one major third-party creditor-
the public fisc. For bankruptcy purposes, a court dealing with the
debt/equity issue must determine whether it would be clearly unfair to
third-party creditors to let a party holding an instrument labelled "debt,"
but whose characteristics are primarily those of an equity security, share
with the third-party creditors on an equal basis. 130
B. Should Public and Private Debt Be Treated Differently?
Junk bonds are issued both publicly and privately, although the pro-
portion of private placement recently has increased because of difficulties
with the market for publicly held junk bonds.' 3 ' Even before the recent
market difficulties, however, most direct junk bond purchasers were large
institutions. 132
The debt/equity issue, so far as it has come up in the bankruptcy con-
text, has not arisen with respect to publicly held securities. 33 Nonethe-
less, in one of the few cases on record in which junk holders challenged
the form-over-substance treatment of an instrument, arguing that such
recharacterization should not apply to publicly traded securities, the
court held that the mere fact of public trading should not affect the char-
acterization of purported debt securities for bankruptcy purposes. 1 34
This holding appears overbroad. Bankruptcy's inherent equitable con-
siderations require that a court balance the interests of an extensive class
of public securities purchasers against those of the debtor and other cred-
itors. Purchasers of publicly traded securities lack the sophistication
characteristic of purchasers of privately placed securities, who, with full
representation, can negotiate particular provisions in the agreements that
govern their investments.' 35 The public trading of a junk bond issue
should therefore weigh against recharacterization. It should not, how-
ever, weigh so heavily that it irrebuttably precludes recharacterization.
130. IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1957).
131. Constance Mitchell & Anita Raghauan, Private Market Attracts Issuers of Junk Bonds,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1990, at Cl.
132. Barker, supra note 26, at 782 (90-95% of junk bond purchasers are institutions); Taggart,
supra note 21, at 11 (Drexel Burnham Lambert estimated that institutions hold 80-90% of junk
bonds).
133. See, eg., In re Hawaii Corp., 694 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1982).
134. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247, 250 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
135. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 67, at 686 n.71.
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If a junk bond issue has pronounced and obvious equity characteristics
such as yields linked to contingencies or far above prevailing market
rates, these characteristics may justify an inference that the buyers
bought the bonds primarily for their equity characteristics.1 36 In cases
like this, because unfairness to third party creditors could well outweigh
any unfairness to junk bond buyers, recharacterization might be
appropriate.
Moreover, the mere fact of registration under the Securities Act of
1933137 may not in itself justify the conclusion that a junk bond issue is
"publicly traded" for bankruptcy purposes. Large institutional investors
often hold registered junk bond offerings, and neither they nor the issuers
intend to disperse such offerings among a broader class of security hold-
ers. Offering bonds in minimum units of $1 million or more is but one
way issuers evidence their intent that the bonds be so held.131
V. CHARACTERIZING JUNK BONDS BASED ON CIRCUMSTANCES AND
FEATURES OF PARTICULAR ISSUES
A. Original Issue Junk
One of the basic considerations for characterizing a junk bond claim is
whether the junk bond issue in question was original issue junk. This
label implies two primary characteristics: 1) the issuer sold the issue in
question to the holders (whether or not through an underwriter or under-
writers) for cash or property, 139 rather than for other securities of the
issuer; and 2) because the issue in question lacked an investment-grade
rating when issued, its initial purchasers bought it as junk. The alterna-
tive situations-junk bonds issued in exchange for other securities or ob-
ligations of the debtor, and obligations that the debtor originally issued
as investment-grade debt-introduce additional complications and will
be discussed below.
136. See Booth, supra note 31, at 558-59 (buyers may be attracted to junk bonds in takeover
context because of their equity characteristics).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - mm (1988).
138. See Barker, supra note 25, at 786-89 (the Pantry Pride offering pursuant to a 1986 takeover
was in minimum denominations of $2.5 million, making it resemble a private placement).
139. Other than previously issued securities of the issuer.
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1. Unsubordinated Debt of Low-Rated or Unrated Issuers
a. Cases in Which Issuer's Debt Is Not Disproportionate to Its
Designated Equity Capital
An appropriate place to begin classifying junk bonds is with issues that
do not present a significant classification problem. If unrated or low-
rated debt securities result from the issuer's lack of a track record or
from the riskiness of the issuer's business, rather than from its internal
capital structure or from the presence in the issue of any of the particular
characteristics discussed below, a court should treat the securities as debt
for bankruptcy purposes. 14° Treatment of an instrument of that kind as
anything but debt would disregard the normal principle that a financially
weak debtor's obligations should not be treated as equity merely because
of those very weaknesses. 4 ' To fit in this class, however, an issuer's debt
should be unsubordinated, labelled "debt, '  proportionate to the por-
tion of the issuer's capitalization the issuer considers equity, should in-
clude a full complement of protective covenants, and should lack any of
the special characteristics discussed below.'43
b. Cases in Which Issuer's Debt Is Unreasonably Large in
Proportion to Its Designated Equity
A junk bond issue must be considered in the context of its issuer's
overall capital structure. If the issuer has ample capital that it expressly
holds as equity, or if the issuer's equity is at least substantial in propor-
tion to its debt, the issuer's debt is probably exactly what it purports to
be.' On the other hand, if the issuer has very little capital that it for-
140. A court could view a junk bond with these characteristics as a securitized term loan, i.e., a
loan much like a bank loan, which would usually constitute debt, but issued in the form of a tradable
security. See Taggart, supra note 21, at 10. Taggart, however, generalizes too broadly in asserting
that junk bonds can be viewed in this way; bank loans generally do not have other junk bond charac-
teristics, such as subordination and the other features discussed infra. See also KLEIN & COFFEE,
supra note 18, at 220.
141. See, e.g., Plumb, supra note 78, at 530-33.
142. The label the parties put on their instrument, while not determinative, is significant; if they
do not call it "debt," it is highly unlikely it will be so treated. See Slappey Drive Indus. Park v.
United States, 561 F.2d 572, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1977). But see Koppers Co. v. American Express Co.,
689 F. Supp. 1371, 1402-03 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (preferred stock held "sufficiently debt-like" to raise
issue under Federal Reserve margin regulations); Caesar's World, Inc. v. Sosnofl', No. CV-1622
WJR, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14293, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 1987) (instrument labeled "preferred
stock" held to be debt for Federal Reserve margin requirement purposes).
143. See infra Section V.A.3.
144. See Alex E. Weinberg, Selected Tax Aspects of Leveraged Buyouts Including Management
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mally labels equity, a court must consider that at least part of the issuer's
putative debt capitalization actually may be serving as equity.145 This is
particularly true if the issuer recently has replaced a substantial part of
its equity capitalization with "debt" securities 146-a circumstance that
frequently follows a leveraged buyout. 47
Thus, an issuer's "thin capitalization" is one of the major reasons to
scrutinize that part of its capitalization that it labels debt for possible
recharacterization as equity. This has long been true both in the bank-
ruptcy1 48 and tax contexts. 149
2. Subordinated Debt
One of the most important factors that can prevent a debt-denomi-
nated instrument from receiving an investment-grade rating is subordina-
tion to other debt. 5 Subordination by its nature makes the
Participation, in LEVERAGED AcQUISITONS AND BuYatYTs 1987, at 105, 116 (Harvey E. Benjamin
and Michael B. Goldberg, Co-Chairmen) (in structuring LBO debt, it may be advisable to divide
debt into layers so that if the lowest level is reclassified as equity, it will support the argument that
senior levels are true debt for tax purposes).
145. See IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d at 184; Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 94-97.
146. See Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1958); IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d at 179, 184.
147. See Weinberg, supra note 144, at 115.
148. IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d at 184 ("When the subsidiary is thus launched by the parent with
an entirely inadequate capitalization and with congenital insolvency, it would be highly inequitable
to allow the parent to share with creditors on the basis of an indebtedness, which represents in reality
nothing but its investment of risk capital.").
149. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 96 (insufficient capitalization when "loans" are made
to debtor may lead to their recharacterization as capital contributions in debtor's bankruptcy);
Gleick, supra note 74, at 611, 612-13, 620-21 (bankruptcy courts may treat alleged debts as contribu-
tions to capital where debtor is undercapitalized); I.R.C. § 385(b)(3) (1988) (debt/equity ratio can be
considered in formulating regulations on whether an interest in a corporation is stock or debt);
Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d at 582; Plumb, supra note 78, at 507-19 ("thin
capitalization" is a major factor in considering debt/equity status for tax purposes).
150. Subordination, depending upon the parties' agreement, can take various forms. At one
extreme is "complete" subordination, which bars any payments to the subordinated creditors, re-
gardless of circumstances, until the debtor fully pays more senior creditors. This type of subordina-
tion is rare, and exists primarily in cases in which the subordinated creditors are insiders of the
debtor. It is not the usual form of junk-bond subordination. See Reade H. Ryan, Jr., The
Subordinated World of Junk Bonds, 105 BANKING L.J. 4, 5 (1988). The other broad division for
subordination has been called "inchoate" subordination in one analysis, see Calligar, supra note 43,
at 377, and "contingent" subordination in a more recent study. Carlson, supra note 88, at 983. In
this type of subordination, the subordinated creditors receive payments from the debtor under the
terms of their instrument until an event of default occurs on the senior debt. After the default, the
debtor must make all payments otherwise due on subordinated debt to the senior creditors until the
default is cured or the debtor fully satisfies the senior creditors' claims. In such cases, the
subordinated creditors are normally deemed to hold any post-default payments that they receive
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subordinated debt an equity-like cushion for the senior debt to which it is
subordinated.15' A bankruptcy court, in considering how to characterize
an issue of subordinated debt, must consider whether the fact of subordi-
nation, by itself or in combination with other factors, justifies treating the
subordinated debt as equity with respect to all other debt.
Tax law has long treated subordination as an important factor in de-
termining whether a "debt" claim actually constitutes equity for tax pur-
poses. 152  Nonetheless, subordination, in and of itself, is a normal
practice that provides advantages for debtors, senior creditors and junior
creditors. 53 It should not, therefore, constitute grounds for recharacter-
ization of debt as equity if present in simple form (i.e., absent multiple
subordination), and if there are no further equity characteristics present
in the instrument.
Subordination, however, can exist under different circumstances,
which may have different consequences in characterizing the instrument
as debt or equity.
a. Debt Subordinated With the Consent of Subordinated
Creditors
Most subordinated debt originates in subordinated form; the subordi-
nation occurs with the consent of its holders.'54 This is significant for
purposes of this analysis because it indicates that the original parties to
the instruments entered their agreement with certain expectations as to
the advantages and detriments of the subordination. Buyers of originally
subordinated instruments clearly bargain for higher risk than those buy-
ing senior debt. The question that must be resolved for purposes of the
(including distributions from the debtor's bankruptcy estate) for the benefit of the senior creditors
(who thus receive "double dividends" in the debtor's bankruptcy-their pro rata share of the
debtor's estate, plus the share of the subordinated creditors, up to the full amount of the senior
creditors' claims against the debtor). Id. at 983-86. Since junk bond subordination is of the latter
type, this Article shall generally consider subordination to follow this pattern unless otherwise
specified.
151. See H.R. REP. No. 54(1), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1989) (certain forms of subordinated
debt constitute "capital" that protects depository institutions by providing a "cushion" to absorb
losses); Robert W. Johnson, Subordinated Debentures: Debt That Serves As Equity, 10 J. FiN. 1, 2,
10 (1955) (subordinated debt functions as equity for purposes of senior lenders); Sheppard, supra
note 29, at 1146 (investment bankers consider subordinated debt to be "functionally equivalent" to
preferred stock).
152. I.R.C. § 385(b)(2) (1988); Plumb, supra note 78, at 497-99.
153. See Carlson, supra note 88, at 983-86.
154. See, eg., Calligar, supra note 43; REED, supra note 49, at 157, 161, 185-95.
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debt/equity issue, however, is whether they are bargaining for so much
risk that the court should consider that they actually have taken an eq-
uity position in the issuer. Of course, this risk relates to the rest of the
issuer's capital structure, and particularly to the risk that the issuer's
trade and involuntary creditors take.
b. Debt Subordinated Without the Express Consent of Its Holders
A more difficult issue arises when the issuer subordinates debt without
the express consent of its holders. Normally, issuers offer such debt to
the public, not with clauses deliberately subordinating its holders' claims
to those of other debt holders, but merely without covenants barring the
issuer from incurring new senior debt.155 The issuer in fact may subse-
quently incur purportedly senior debt. In a subsequent bankruptcy case,
the court must decide whether the instruments creating the purportedly
junior debt implied the subordination. Given the severe consequences of
subordination, even absent possible recharacterization, equitable consid-
erations suggest that the court should respect subordination of this kind
only if the parties clearly so intended at the time they created the junior
debt.156 Furthermore, courts should not weigh such implied subordina-
tion in the same way as express subordination in considering whether
debt actually constitutes disguised equity.
c. "Structurally Subordinated" Debt
Debt may be subordinated de facto as well as by express subordination
agreements. The most common method for such subordination is the
security agreement, which in effect subordinates unsecured creditors to
secured creditors with respect to specific assets of the debtor.157 Security
interests on substantially all of the issuer's property may as effectively
subordinate unsecured creditors' claims as if they had entered express
subordination agreements with the secured creditors.
A second kind of structural subordination may arise from the formal
structure of a corporate group. In such a group, creditors of a parent
corporation have no direct claim to the assets of a subsidiary. Their
claim instead is limited to the subsidiary's stock that the parent owns.
155. Junk bond indentures often restrict the issuer's right to issue new debt senior to the debt the
indentures create. See REED, supra note 49, at 161. The absence of such restrictions therefore
creates some doubt that the parties drafting the indenture really intended it to create debt.
156. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 32, at 92.
157. See REED, supra note 49, at 117-18, 121-22.
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Because stockholders' interests are subordinate to the claims of the sub-
sidiary's creditors, the parent's creditors' claims are structurally
subordinate to those of the subsidiary's creditors. 15 8 When a parent cor-
poration holds little or no property except its stock in subsidiaries, and
when the parent issues substantial unsecured debt-a frequent situation
in LBO financing-the parent's unsecured creditors are effectively
subordinated to the creditors of the operating subsidiaries. 5 9
d. Multiple Subordination
Highly leveraged debtors may create hierarchies of debt subordination.
A creditor may be multiply subordinated as the result of subordination to
more than one senior creditor at the same level, or subordination to one
or more senior creditors who in turn are subordinated to other credi-
tors. 60 The latter type of multiple subordination especially will increase
the uncertainty of payment to creditors at the deeper levels of subordina-
tion, making their claims look far more like equity interests.' 6'
Multiple subordination may be express or based on one or more layers
of structural subordination-a frequent circumstance in large LBOs. 62
If, for example, there are three layers of debt-bank debt secured by sub-
stantially all the debtor's property, "mezzanine" unsecured debt, 63 and
junk bond debt subordinated to the "mezzanine" debt-the lowest layer
will be multiply subordinated even in the unlikely case that it is not ex-
pressly subordinated to the bank debt. The same is true when structural
subordination occurs based on the corporate structure of a group of cor-
porate affiliates. Structural subordination may add several layers to a
hierarchy of subordinated securities.
The ultimate case of multiple subordination is global subordination:
158. Id. at 193-95.
159. See, e.g., The Cooper Companies, Inc., Senior Extendible Notes due 1/1/93, 79 MOODY'S
BOND SURVEY 4338-39 (1987).
160. See REED supra note 49, at 157 (junk debt may include both senior subordinated debt and
junior subordinated debt, the latter being subordinated to the former).
161. See Johnson, supra note 151, at 15 (junior subordinated debt resembles preferred stock);
Weinberg, supra note 144, at 116.
162. See Weinberg, supra note 144, at 116 (multiple levels of debt are normally needed for large
LBO's).
163. See BRUCK, supra note 24, at 98-99. When there are multiple levels of subordinated debt,
mezzanine debt may consist of senior subordinated debt. See REED, supra note 49, at 118. The
term "mezzanine debt," Wall Street argot rather than a technical term, also has been used to desig-
nate all debt junior to senior secured debt in the LBO context. Its intermediate status, when so used,
is between such senior debt and preferred or common stock. See Sheppard, supra note 30, at 1143.
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the subordination of a claim to all other claims against the debtor. Be-
cause universal subordination is a major characteristic of equity, a claim
of this type is almost certainly equity rather than debt.1 While such
recharacterization will not make any real difference in determining the
relative priorities between holders of globally subordinated claims and
other claim holders, it may significantly affect the validity of interest
payments on such claims, voting rights in a reorganization case, and
fraudulent transfer issues. 165
3. Debt With Other Special Characteristics
a. Excessive Interest Rates
High interest rates are the most important single characteristic of junk
bonds; the most frequently used alternative term for these instruments is,
after all, "high-yield bonds." 166 While high yield is not necessarily a suf-
ficient reason to recharacterize a security as equity, the yield may be so
high that it actually represents a residual claim on corporate profits,
rather than a creditor-type claim on which unconditional payment rea-
sonably can be expected. 167 Because an extremely high yield is one of the
most important and obvious features of a junk bond, the yield should be
one of the most decisive factors in deciding whether to recharacterize a
particular security. A yield that far exceeds prevailing market rates for
corporate bonds with the lowest investment grade ratings 6 ' could read-
ily justify recharacterization, particularly if combined with some of the
other factors enumerated here. The ease with which even an unsophisti-
cated observer can ascertain that a given interest rate greatly exceeds
rates available on conventional debt makes action of this kind more fair
to investors than reclassification based on less readily ascertainable
factors.
164. See Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364, 370 (3d Cir. 1977).
165. See infra Section VI.B.
166. See, e.g., Asquith, supra note 21, at 923 and passim; Taggart, supra note 21, at 5; BRUCK,
supra note 24, at 39 and passim.
167. See Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d at 370 n.7; Plumb, supra note 78, at 439-
440; Weinberg, supra note 144, at 116 (interest rate should not be so high as to indicate that a
commercial lender would be unlikely to approve such a loan, or that interest payments could not be
met given management earnings projections).
168. While courts faced with this question will decide on a case-by-case basis whether to reclas-
sify a given junk bond, a yield 30% higher than the current rate for BBB-rated securities of compa-
rable maturity should justify careful scrutiny of the instrument in question.
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b. Deferred Interest: Original Issue Discount and
Payment in Kind
Junk bonds may offer their high yields on a deferred basis. This may
be done in several ways: 1) by offering the bonds at an original issue
discount (OID)1 69 rather than by regular interest payments commencing
at a normal period after the initial offering; 2) by commencing of interest
payments more than a year after the initial offering, resulting in a hybrid
of OlD and subsequent interest payments;1 70 and 3) by paying interest in
kind rather than in cash ("paid-in-kind" or "PIK" in Wall Street
jargon). Issuers usually pay PIK interest in the form of other securi-
ties.'71 These include "mini-bonds"-further promises to pay the holder
at a later date-and common or preferred shares in the issuer.172 In
either case, PIK interest represents a combination of present and de-
ferred income, and the underlying securities therefore compensate their
holders similarly to those in category (2).
While the use of discount, as opposed to periodic interest payments,
should not in itself require recharacterization of discounted securities as
equity,1 73 the use of discount in combination with a long maturity date
generally increases risk,1 74 and makes final payment heavily contingent
on issuer performance. In fact, the issuer's inability to meet current pay-
ments is the most likely reason for the interest-payment deferral.' 7 5
Such absence of liquidity leads to further concern that defaults may oc-
cur when deferred obligations finally do mature.1 76 Therefore, courts
169. When firms issue debt securities at a discount, the discount is described as original issue
discount or "OID." If original issue discount makes up the entire compensation to purchasers of the
securities-if, in other words, the issuer will not make periodic interest payments-the securities also
may be described as "zero coupon" debt. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. 51, 55 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990); BRUCK, supra note 24, at 267-68.
170. See Sheppard, supra note 30, at 1144.
171. See Junk!; House of Cards, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 1990, at 83-84.
172. Major issuers of PIK bonds include Greyhound Lines, RJR Nabisco (pursuant to its LBO),
Community Newspapers, and MCorp. Roger Lowenstein, Rise of a Junk Play, WALL ST. J., June 4,
1990, at C2.
173. It would be unreasonable, after all, to view Treasury bills, sold at a discount, as anything
but pure debt.
174. Note, for example, the higher variability of the value of "stripped" securities, which sepa-
rate principal from interest obligations. See, eg., Taylor, supra note 101, at 850-52.
175. Professor Louis Lowenstein has characterized zero coupon junk bonds, particularly in the
LBO context, as "superjunk," because an issuer bases its use of OlD in this context on its inability to
make interest payments ab initio. Louis Lowenstein, Introduction and Foreword: Lessonsfor Wall
Street from Main Street, 15 J. CORP. L. 161, 164-65 (1990).
176. Lowenstein, supra note 172, at C2; Junk's House of Cards, supra note 171, at 83.
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generally should weigh the debtors' use of discount, particularly over a
long period, in favor of equity characterization.
c. Variable Interest
Interest may be variable as well as fixed. Given the economic climate
of the last decade, during which prevailing interest rates have varied sig-
nificantly, an increasing number of financial instruments have been is-
sued with variable interest rates. 177
Instruments issued with interest rates that vary based upon purely ex-
ternal factors-such as prime rates set by certain major financial institu-
tions on given dates-should not therefore be subject to
recharacterization as equity, even though the variability may increase the
risk of issuer default in periods of rising interest rates. Variability of this
kind makes the instruments more attractive to risk-averse investors, by
addressing the concern that the instrument's secondary-market value will
decline in a climate of rising interest rates. 178 In so doing, externally
adjusted rates address a debt-oriented concern, rather than the profit-
oriented concern of equity-flavored instruments.
On the other hand, if issuer management has discretion to adjust inter-
est rates, or if interest rates are adjusted based on circumstances internal
to the issuer, the variability takes on a contingent quality and raises the
issues discussed below. 17 9
d. Contingent Interest
One of the chief features of ordinary debt is that it carries an absolute
promise to pay interest on certain dates.'8 0 Making interest payments
contingent on certain future events therefore tends to make an instru-
ment with such features bear less resemblance to paradigmatic debt. The
nature of the contingencies will help determine whether the instrument is
so far from the debt paradigm that a court should recharacterize it as
equity.
177. See Fabozzi & Sauvain, supra note 18, at 317-18.
178. Id.
179. See infra Sections V.A.3.d and V.A.3.e. The indenture may, however, limit managerial
discretion by giving debt-holders the right to force the issuer to redeem their bonds after the issuer
changes the interest rate. See, e.g., proposed issue of senior extendible notes by Seminole Kraft
Corp., 79 MOODY'S BOND SURVEY 5203-04 (1987). Such limitation would reduce the impact of
issuer discretion, strengthening the argument for characterizing such instruments as debt.
180. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text; Plumb, supra note 78, at 404, 430-31.
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Contingencies are least troublesome when fixed in the original junk
bond indenture, and when based on factors external to the issuer, such as
prevailing interest rates and market conditions. They raise more serious
questions when based on factors over which the issuer has control, de-
pending on the degree of such control. The issuer's payment status on
senior debt, for example, involves less issuer control than does its overall
debt/equity ratio at various time intervals. As the issuer's control over
the contingencies increases, and as the contingencies become more di-
rectly related to the profitability of the issuer's business, the equity flavor
of the instrument increases.""' Equity characteristics begin to
predominate as the issuer's management acquires discretion over the
payment of the issuer's obligations on a debt instrument; at that point,
the payments begin to look more like dividends than payment of interest
and principal.' 8 2
e. Availability of Additional Return
Similarly, the amount of interest and repaid principal is normally a
sum certain on pure debt instruments. If purported debt instruments
make additional return available under certain circumstances, they may
begin to assume equity characteristics in important ways; indeed, one of
equity's chief advantages over debt is the availability of an "upside" to its
holders. 183
The least controversial type of additional return takes the form of in-
terest penalties. If the rate of interest is subject to increase on the issuer's
default or other noncompliance with indenture terms, the increase actu-
ally serves to protect the debt characteristic of certainty of payment.
Such provisions, therefore, should not add significant equity flavor to a
junk bond issue.
At the other extreme are provisions that make additional interest pay-
able based on the issuer's profits. This kind of participation in profits is,
as noted above, a strong equity characteristic.' 84 While the addition of
such participation to an otherwise fixed interest rate in itself will not be
181. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1968); Talbot Mills v.
Commissioner, 146 F.2d 809, 811-12 (Ist Cir. 1944), aff'd sub nom. John Kelley Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Johnson, supra note 151, at 13.
182. See Wetterau Grocer Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 158, 160 (8th Cir. 1950) (payment of
interest at directors' discretion, subject to corporation's earnings, was more characteristic of divi-
dends than of interest); Plumb, supra note 78, at 430-32.
183. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
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decisive for purposes of recharacterization, a court needs to consider the
participation in the context of the terms of the instrument. If, for exam-
ple, the underlying interest rate is unrealistically low for an instrument of
its risk level, then the buyer of such an instrument will look more toward
participation than a fixed rate of return, and the instrument will take on a
stronger equity flavor. Provisions of this kind could, inter alia, act as a
substitute for more conventional features such as convertibility. More-
over, a court must consider these features in the presence or absence of
the other characteristics described in this section. For instance, a long-
lived instrument in which profit participation compensates for abnor-
mally low interest rates, combined with other features such as manage-
ment discretion, may come very close to being a pure equity instrument.
f Long Maturity Dates
The longer the span between issue and final principal repayment, the
more uncertain the final repayment and the more the underlying issue
resembles equity."8 5 Maturity, as a factor in the debt/equity equation,
covers a spectrum running from the ultimate paradigm of debt, the de-
mand note, 186 to instruments that give the holder no right to principal
repayment at any time, thus conforming to an ultimate paradigm of eq-
uity investment.
Long maturity dates normally should not force recharacterization in
and of themselves, although an "unreasonably long" term in relation to
the business of the issuer might have that effect.18 7 It is more likely that
the combination of long maturity, high risk, and other factors such as
deferred interest and convertibility will indicate that the instrument is
really equity.
g. Stretchout Provisions
Stretchout provisions enable the issuer to delay otherwise-required
principal and interest payments.' 8 They are of potentially significant
185. See Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 573, 581 (5th Cir. 1977) (because
a lender stands to gain only a fixed interest rate, it would not be likely to take risk associated with
committing its funds "for a prolonged period").
186. A demand note is payable at any time on the creditor's demand. Commercial bankers
holding senior debt generally prefer that the debtors repay the loans in five years or fewer. See
Sheppard, supra note 30, at 1143.
187. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 415-20.
188. See Larry Light et al., Yesterday's Bad Deals Are Today's New Business, BUSINESs WEEK,
Dec. 11, 1989, at 96.
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value to an issuer uncertain of the prospects for its business or of its
ability to sell key assets to service its debt. By thus asserting issuer con-
trol, stretchout provisions diminish holders' rights to payments on dates
certain, increase the contingency of payments on issuer discretion and
performance, and thereby tend to weigh in favor of equity characteriza-
tion. Tax jurisprudence has endorsed this view, 189 and no good reasons
suggest drawing different conclusions in the bankruptcy context.
h. Convertibility to Equity
(I) At Instance of Holders
Long before the emergence of a distinct market for junk bonds, and at
least as early as the late nineteenth century, 190 corporate debtors issued
instruments whose features included convertibility to equity shares at
prices fixed in advance. 191 This kind of convertibility in itself made in-
struments of this kind debt/equity hybrids, raising questions as to
whether, for corporate law purposes, such instruments constituted debt
or equity.192 Policy considerations under bankruptcy law are signifi-
cantly different, but convertibility at the holder's instance is nonetheless
a factor courts should weigh in the overall determination of whether the
securities bearing the feature constitute equity for bankruptcy purposes.
(II) At Instance of Issuers
Debt securities convertible to equity at the instance of the issuer are
significantly different from securities convertible at the instance of the
holder. Courts should treat debt convertible to equity at the issuer's op-
tion as equity even absent other equity characteristics;' 93 the issuer's op-
tion effectively gives it control of whether to pay on the securities, and
189. Plumb, supra note 78, at 417-418.
190. See Sutliffv. Cleveland & Mahoning M.R.R., 24 Ohio St. 147 (1873); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Worcester, N. & R. R.R., 149 Mass. 214, 215 (1889) (convertible bonds issued 1874
pursuant to 1873 New Hampshire statute); Day v. Worcester, N. & R. R.R., 23 N.E. 824 (Mass.
1890) (convertible bonds issued 1874 pursuant to 1873 New Hampshire statute); Pratt v. American
Bell Tel. Co., 5 N.E. 307-308 (Mass. 1886) (convertible notes issued 1882); Parkinson v. West End
St. Ry., 53 N.E. 891 (Mass. 1899); Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 67, at 682-83.
191. See William A. Klein, The Convertible Bond: A Peculiar Package, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 547
(1975).
192. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 67, at 682-83; Klein, supra note 191, at 559-60,
562, 567, 570 (issuers have tended to view traditional, i.e., non-junk, convertible bonds as deferred
equity financing).
193. See Covey Inv. Co. v. United States, 377 F.2d 403, 405 (10th Cir. 1967) (where issuer had
option to convert notes to common stock, notes were equity for tax purposes).
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deprives holders of the basic hallmarks of debt: rights to payment of
interest and principal. This analysis also applies to securities, nominally
convertible to equity at the holder's option, whose economic terms make
conversion de facto mandatory. 194 Therefore, convertibility should at
least attach to such securities a rebuttable presumption that they are dis-
guised equity.
(III) At Instance of Third Parties
Certain debt may also be convertible to equity at the instances of third
parties such as affiliates of the issuer or senior lenders. Courts should
consider the identity of such parties and their relationship to the issuer in
determining the impact of such convertibility on the status of the debt
subject to conversion. Convertibility at the instance of an issuer's parent,
for example, could be considered analogous to convertibility at the is-
suer's option, while convertibility at the instance of a senior lender might
more closely resemble conventional subordination.
i Control
Control over an issuer's management, an important equity characteris-
tic,195 is typically not a junk bond feature, except as a default right. This
absence should not, in and of itself, be treated as a factor for debt charac-
terization, however, since absence of control except on default is a com-
mon feature of preferred stock, the equity status of which is normally
subject to little question. The presence of unusual control rights196 in a
junk bond issue, however, would weigh strongly in favor of equity
characterization.
j. Security Interests
The presence of a security interest in certain collateral is normally
strong evidence that the instrument in question is debt. 97 Nonetheless,
deep subordination of secured debt' may make the security illusory.
194. See Taylor, supra note 101, at 857 (where issuer had right to call convertible notes at
substantially less than par value, there was "very high probability" of conversion, resulting in IRS
ruling that notes constituted equity).
195. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 447-50.
196. For instance, a right to vote for one or more directors when the issuer is not in default, or
more than conventional debtholders' rights on default.
197. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 466-70.
198. Subordination of debentures will not itself prevent the parties from securing such deben-
tures. Midwest Say. Ass'n v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 758 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 (D. Minn. 1991).
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Moreover, if the circumstances under which the parties created the in-
strument indicate that they really intended to give the "lender" an eq-
uity-type interest, a security interest alone will not transform that
interest into debt 1 99
In this context, it is worth noting that firms have been known to use
security interests to make certain the payment of dividends and liquida-
tion preferences on preferred stock. Although security interests of this
kind would be ineffective as against genuine creditors of the issuer, they
could protect their holders against other shareholder classes, and their
mere presence has not necessarily led courts to reclassify such instru-
ments as debt.2"c Therefore, the presence of a security interest should
not, without more, preclude reclassification of a purported debt instru-
ment as equity, if its other characteristics strongly indicate that the par-
ties intended that the secured party have an equity-type interest.
k Call and Redemption Rights
Call and redemption rights permit the termination of bond contracts
before the normal maturity dates of the issues in question. Call rights are
present in most junk bond issues.2"' They permit an issuer to terminate
its obligation on a bond issue, prior to its normal maturity date, by pay-
ing all principal and interest due at the time of the call, often with a
slight additional amount added as a premium.2 "2 A bondholder with re-
demption rights203 can force the issuer to pay off all interest and principal
199. IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1957)(mortgage indebtedness subordinated to
claims of general creditors on finding by court that it was "not a loan in any true sense at all," but an
"investment of risk capital," i.e., an equity-type interest).
200. See Warren v. King, 108 U.S. 389 (1883)(nature of preferred stock held not altered by
provision creating lien on corporation's property to secure its dividends and liquidation preference);
Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R.R. v. Continental Trust Co., 95 F. 497 (6th Cir. 1899) (provision in pre-
ferred stock agreement making it a lien on the corporation's property held valid). See also Arnold v.
Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1941) (mortgage on corporation's property purporting to
secure equity interest held ineffective "as against creditors"); Dayton & Mich. R.R. v. Commis-
sioner, 112 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1940) (preferred stock held equity for tax purposes despite mortgage
securing dividends thereon).
201. Asquith, supra note 21, at 936.
202. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 393-94; Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra
note 67, at 678.
203. An issuer redeems a bond by paying its principal before the bond's stated maturity date.
See 6A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 2731 (rev. perm. ed. 1989). A call right, as noted above, is the issuer's right to redeem at or after a
given date without penalty beyond that stated in the bond indenture itself. The indenture also may
give the holder the power to compel the issuer to redeem the bond at a date prior to its stated
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at the holder's option.2" By shortening the life-span of an issue, both
call and redemption rights tend to support debt characterization; they
bring the issue closer to the ultimate paradigm of the demand note.
Call rights also serve to limit equity-like features such as conversion
rights by giving the issuer the right to force the use or loss of such rights
at the time most favorable to the issuer.2 °5 In the junk bond context,
they not only serve the classic purpose of limiting the value of conversion
privileges, 2" but they also give the issuer the right to terminate payment
of high interest rates as soon as the issuer is able to obtain financing at
lower rates. Consequently, they serve to limit the rights of holders to any
residual income of the issuer, thus reducing the weight of one of the most
important equity characteristics that junk bond issues may have.
Call rights themselves, however, may have little effectiveness if the is-
suer lacks the wherewithal to exercise them. If, at the time of issue, the
issuer's ability to exercise call rights is unclear in the short run, their
mere existence should not weigh heavily toward debt characterization.
It should also be noted that call and redemption rights often appear in
preferred stock issues, and do not force recharacterization of such issues
as debt.2 °7 Call and redemption rights are thus factors a court should
weigh on the side of debt characterization; they are not in themselves
decisive.
L Substitution for Equity
Junk bonds often directly or indirectly replace securities that issuers
formally labelled equity. In LBOs in particular, firms raise capital
through junk bonds to pay off the shareholders they buy out.2 °0 Junk
bonds' replacement of equity securities invites even closer scrutiny as to
maturity. This Article uses the term "redemption right" to distinguish this right in a bondholder
from the issuer's call right.
204. The right to compel redemption, often described as a "put," can be a useful supplement to
bond covenants in protecting the bondholder by giving the bondholder the right to have his or her
bonds redeemed if the issuer fails to comply with certain conditions of creditworthiness. The bond-
holder may, for example, have the right to compel redemption if the issuer terminates certain con-
tracts with third parties, or if a specified third party ceases to be a major shareholder in the issuer.
See, e.g., Seminole Kraft Corp., senior extendible notes due Sept. 15, 1999, 79 MOODY'S BOND
SURVEY 5203-04 (1987).
205. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 67, at 678-80.
206. Id.
207. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 451.
208. See Booth, supra note 31, at 556-57; Weinberg, supra note 144, at 112-13.
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whether they should be treated as equity.2 °c
The other most frequent instance in which junk bonds replace equity
securities occurs when they are issued pursuant to an exchange offer for
the latter. This situation will be discussed separately below.210
n. Sinking Fund Provisions
Sinking fund provisions allow the debtor to set aside certain amounts,
in advance of actual payment dates, for the payment of debt obliga-
tions.2" ' Because sinking funds serve to make the eventual payment of
such obligations more certain,21 2 their presence tends to support debt
characterization.213 Nonetheless, a bankruptcy court should not rely on
the mere existence of a sinking fund to treat as debt an instrument that
otherwise strongly resembles equity.21 4 In such cases, the court should
use the sinking fund accounts to satisfy higher priority claims until the
latter claims are paid in ful. 2 15
n. Presence or Absence of Protective Covenants
Since courts historically have based protection of bondholders' rights
more upon their contracts with the issuer than upon inherent duties that
the debtors' management owes to bondholders, 216 the bondholders rely
heavily on protective covenants in the instruments creating the debt.21 7
Covenants of this kind have become highly standardized. 21 8 The most
209. See Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1958); IT&T v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 179, 184
(4th Cir. 1957); Wetterau Grocer Co. v. Comm'r, 179 F.2d at 160 (payments on "notes" issued in
exchange for preferred stock held dividends rather than interest for tax purposes); Talbot Mills v.
Comm'r, 146 F.2d at 810-12.
210. See infra section V.C.
211. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 394 n.29.
212. See FLETCHER, supra note 203, at § 2732.
213. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 466-70.
214. See In re Hawkeye Oil Co., 19 F.2d 151, 152 (D. Del. 1927) (bankruptcy court character-
ized securities as equity despite sinking fund support for payments to their holders); United States &
Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Serv. Co., 19 F.2d 624, 625-26 (W.D. Pa. 1924) (certifi-
cates supported by deposits designated as "sinking fund" or "bond fund" treated as equity in bank-
ruptcy of issuer).
215. United States & Mexican Oil Co., 19 F.2d at 626.
216. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 67, at 668-69, 685-88.
217. See Lehn, supra note 19, at 173, 177; Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships, supra note 2,
at 117, 139-42; REED supra note 49, at 144-50.
218. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 67, at 686-91; Bratton, Corporate Debt Relation-
ships, supra note 2, at 105 n.42, 117; REED supra note 49, at 158-62; AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE
PROVISIONS: (1965); MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS: ALL REGISTERED ISSUES:
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important covenants for our purposes reinforce debt characteristics by
preventing corporate management from demoting the securities that they
protect to more subordinated status, and by generally making payment of
the instruments that they protect more certain.
Covenants of this kind include negative pledge clauses, which limit the
issuer's rights to grant liens on its property,219 and which thereby protect
debt holders from structural subordination to additional secured credi-
tors.220 Closely related to negative pledge clauses are covenants that
limit the issuer's rights to engage in sale and leaseback transactions,
which encumber property in ways that are often hard to distinguish from
secured loans.221
Other important covenants limit the issuer's right to incur additional
debt, including debt senior to that which the covenants in question pro-
tect, and debt of equal seniority with the protected debt. Such protection
may be absolute, i.e., barring the issuer from issuing any debt in a given
class, or may require that the issuer meet certain tests, such as possession
of specified amounts of tangible net worth in proportion to permitted,
newly issued additional debt.222
Covenants also protect debt by limiting the issuer's ability to make
distributions to lower-ranking security holders. The most important dis-
tributions of this kind are dividends paid to stockholders and repurchase
by the corporation of its own stock. As with limitations on incurring
new debt, limitations of this kind can absolutely prohibit the distribu-
tions in question, or can condition the distributions on issuer compliance
with certain financial prerequisites that assure that the issuer will have
assets sufficient to pay the protected debt even after it makes distribu-
tions to junior security holders.223
The absence of key protective covenants, noteworthy in many junk
bond indentures, 224 not only indicates that the junk bonds in question
lack important debt characteristics, but also makes the holders more sub-
AND CERTAIN NEGOTIABLE PROVISIONS WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED IN A PARTICULAR INCORPO-
RATING INDENTURE (1971) [hereinafter ABF COMMENTARIES].
219. See, e.g., ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 218, at 349-367.
220. See supra Section V.A.2.c.
221. See, e.g., ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 218, at 432-449.
222. Id. at 368-400.
223. Id. at 401-21.
224. See, eg., REPORT, supra note 19, at 24 (Metromedia replaced much of the bank financing
for its LBO with junk bonds, reducing its interest rates as well as freeing it from important restrictive
covenants).
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ject to the discretion of the issuer's management. The absence of cove-
nants may therefore indicate that the parties to the instrument intended
to create an equity rather than a debt relationship.
o. Holders' Rights on Issuer's Default
Why and when bondholders225 may declare a bond issuer in default,
and the bondholders' rights upon the declaration of default, are impor-
tant in protecting their interests against the issuer.226 The unconditional
nature of a debt obligation requires that, at the very least, bondholders be
able to declare a default upon any issuer failure to pay interest or princi-
pal, and in the event that the issuer defaults on any of its other
obligations.
The bondholders' ability to call a default on the issuer's breach of im-
portant protective covenants further reinforces the debt-like nature of an
instrument,227 since absence of such a right could largely vitiate such
covenants. "Hair-trigger" provisions may also support debt characteri-
zation for an instrument. These provisions enable bondholders to call a
default before an actual cessation of payments, based on the issuer's fail-
ure to comply with certain minimum requirements as to its financial con-
dition, or based on some harm that threatens the issuer's ability to
continue payment. 228 Hair-trigger provisions enable debt holders to
maximize chances of recovering all that the issuer owes them by letting
holders assert their rights while the issuer still has assets against which
they can realize their claims. Provisions of this type also give debt hold-
ers greater bargaining power against the issuer's management, particu-
larly in workout situations.
The absence of such provisions, particularly the right to call defaults
on the issuer's breach of its payment obligations, may indicate that the
parties intended an equity rather than a debt relationship. The absence
or attenuation of key rights on default, particularly the right to accelerate
the entire indebtedness protected by the default provisions, 229 make de-
fault provisions useless and therefore may suggest that the parties in-
tended an equity relationship.
225. Under usual circumstances, a corporate bond-issue trustee acts for the bondholders.
226. See REED, supra note 49, at 150-52; see also, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR
act I, sc. ii ("[De]fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves").
227. See supra Section V.A.3.n.
228. See, e.g., ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 218 at 212-16.
229. See id. at 217-19.
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p. Proportionality to Common Stock Holdings
In the tax context, the issuance of "debt" to shareholders of the issuer,
in proportion to their shareholdings, is considered a strong indication
that the "debt" may actually represent equity interests. 230 This is also a
strong indication of equity status in the bankruptcy context;23 but be-
cause junk bonds normally represent an effort to raise capital from
sources other than the common stockholders of the issuer, the propor-
tionality issue is unlikely to arise for most junk bond issues.
B. "Fallen Angels"
"Fallen angels" were among the original junk bonds.232 They are debt
securities, originally issued with investment-grade ratings, that the rating
agencies downgraded for any of a number of reasons.233 The reasons
may have nothing to do with the characteristics of the security, but in-
stead simply may reflect changes in the credit characteristics of the is-
suer. On the other hand, downgrading may reflect the rating agencies'
realization of flaws inherent in the instrument downgraded. The agen-
cies also might recognize, in light of changing circumstances such as an
LBO or leveraged recapitalization, that a particular instrument has
weaker credit characteristics not just because of increased leverage on the
part of its issuer, but because of features of the instrument such as a lack
of protective covenants.234
230. See Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d at 583-84; Fin Hay Realty Co. v.
United States, 398 F.2d at 696-98; Plumb, supra note 78, at 470-73.
231. See L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 668, 670 (4th Cir. 1957) (the fact that a corpora-
tion allegedly owed debt to its shareholders in rough proportion to their interests in the corporation
was a factor in court's holding that the alleged debt was equity interest subordinated to claims of
third-party creditors in the corporation's bankruptcy); In re Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 167
F.2d 318, 319 (stockholders' loans to their corporation, made in proportion to their equity holdings,
subordinated to claims of third-party creditors).
232. Before a distinct market for junk bonds developed, major issuers such as Chrysler and Ford
had their debt down-graded from time to time into the high-yield range, largely because adverse
changes in their business made rating agencies consider their debt to be high risk. Only in 1977,
however, did Lehman Brothers begin underwriting corporate debt deliberately issued with high-risk,
high-yield characteristics. A market for these securities really began to develop somewhat later,
when Drexel Burnham Lambert perceived strong demand for them and saw them as a means of
developing its own business. REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6. See also Paul C. Judge, S. & P. Cuts
Ratings of Detroit's Big 3, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at DI (Standard & Poor's downgrades Chrysler
senior debt to junk bond level); Taggart, supra note 21, at 8; Floyd, supra note 19, at 923-24; BRUCK,
supra note 24, at 27-28 ("fallen angels" were among the original junk bonds).
233. See, e.g., BRUCK, supra note 24, at 27-28. See also LEWIS, supra note 31, at 212-13.
234. See, e.g., Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships, supra note 2, at 139-42 (Increased trust
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Generally, if issuers initially sold bonds with investment-grade ratings
under normal market conditions, there should be a strong presumption
in favor of treating them as debt. For a publicly held issue, this should
be an almost irrebuttable presumption, since investors in public, rated
debt rely heavily on the rating and on the characteristics of the debt in
deciding to invest.235 They invest in these instruments to receive a fixed
rate of return at a given-and limited-level of risk, not to participate in
the profits of a particular issuer. Such investors rely primarily on rating-
agency research and are not well positioned to make their own investiga-
tions into the factors that, under changing circumstances, may later lead
to the agencies' downgrading their securities into the junk bond
category. 236
C. Exchange Offer Junk
During the late 1980s, junk bonds often were not issued directly for
cash, but instead were issued in exchange for other securities. Exchange
offers for outstanding securities have become important for issuers at-
tempting to reduce painfully heavy levels of debt, including extreme situ-
ations in which the issuer needed the exchanges to stave off defaults.2 37
Exchanges of this kind have become frequent enough that some major
equity speculators have bought junk bonds as equity investments, with
the expectation that issuers will exchange the junk bonds for equity in-
struments with normal features of common stock such as voting rights.
In evaluating junk bond issues for possible acquisition, these speculators
value the issues as they would value expressly denominated equity
securities.238
Firms making exchange offers for distressed junk bonds may offer pre-
ferred or common stock in exchange for the junk bonds in question.239
They may also, however, seek to exchange other junk bonds, sometimes
during post-World War II era led to the gradual dropping of protective covenants such as restric-
tions on new debt, until the beginning of a new era of corporate financial restructuring in the 1980s).
235. See, eg., McDaniel, supra note 18, at 238-45.
236. See, eg., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Dis-
closure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 745-47 (1984); Coffee, Unstable Coalitions, supra note 2, at
1510 n.51.
237. See, e.g., Asquith, supra note 21, at 924-25, 933-36 (distressed issuers of high-yield bonds
often use exchange offers to forestall defaults); BRUCK, supra note 24, at 75-77, 124. See also Mark
J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 232-33, 236, 246-48 (1987).
238. Roger Lowenstein, Rise of a Junk Play: Betting on Equity, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1990, at
Cl.
239. See Roe, supra note 237, at 236, 241; BRUCK, supra note 24, at 75.
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in combination with cash and/or preferred or common stock, for the
distressed issue.240 The junk bonds that investors receive in exchange for
a distressed issue usually have features that significantly differ from the
bonds that they surrender. The issuer and the holders expect that these
features will make it easier for the issuer to meet terms of the junk bonds.
Changed features may include lower interest rates; deferred interest;241
new convertibility into other securities of the issuer, or convertibility at
more favorable rates of exchange; 242 removal of protective covenants,
such as limits on the creation of new liens on the issuer's property and of
new issuer debt senior to the instruments in question;243 limitation of
holders' default remedies, and removal of conditions whose violation
would enable holders of the instrument to invoke default remedies. 2 "
Issuers generally attempt to induce holders to engage in these ex-
changes by threatening to file bankruptcy petitions if the exchange offers
fail.245 In some cases, issuers offer positive incentives such as partial pay-
ment in cash.
While distressed-issuer exchanges are the most common exchange of-
fers, there are several other types. Each exchange has special character-
istics that must be considered in order to properly determine how to deal
with the junk bonds received pursuant to the exchange under bankruptcy
law.
L Debt Received in Exchange for Equity
There are special considerations for debt that holders have received in
exchange for other securities. Apart from theoretical considerations, a
special body of legal doctrine applies to such debt, particularly under
Robinson v. Wangemann 2" and its progeny. The Robinson doctrine
provides that, in bankruptcy, debt received in exchange for equity is
subordinated to all other debt of the issuer.
In Robinson, Arthur Wangemann was a large shareholder and presi-
dent of the Wangemann-Reichardt Company. In October, 1922, he ex-
changed an equity interest in the corporation for debt by selling the
240. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 109 B.R. at 52; Asquith, supra note 21, at 933.
241. See supra Section V.A.3.b.
242. See supra Section V.A.3.h.
243. See supra Section V.A.3.n.
244. See Roe, supra note 237, at 241, 247-48; BRUCK, supra note 24, at 38, 74-77. See also
supra Section V.A.3.o.
245. See BRUCK, supra note 24, at 75-79.
246. 75 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1935).
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corporation 500 of its own shares and taking its note for $55,000 in re-
turn. The corporate board duly authorized the exchange, which it made
at a time when the corporation was solvent. The note was due January 1,
1923, but the corporation issued renewal notes instead of paying in full as
of that date. The corporation filed for bankruptcy several years later,
while at least $32,000 in principal and an unspecified amount of interest
on the debt were still outstanding. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's allowance of the claim of Wangemann's heir for this amount. In
so holding, the court noted that both the solvency of the corporation at
the time of the initial exchange, and the good faith of the parties, were
immaterial to the claim;24 7 the doctrine thus does not rely on fraudulent
transfer law.24 Rather, it is based on the premise that a corporation may
not distribute assets to its shareholders at a time when any of its debts are
unpaid. When a corporation makes a distribution of this kind in the
form of a debt instrument-a promise to pay-such a promise necessar-
ily includes the condition that no payment may be made until the corpo-
ration pays third-party creditors in full. 49
The Robinson doctrine, though followed in other circuits and never
overruled,25 has not been raised by trustees in bankruptcy in certain re-
cent cases involving debt securities received in exchange for equity.2"
These omissions appear to be based on inadvertence rather than desue-
tude, since other recent cases follow the doctrine.252
One must also consider the particular characteristics of the exchanged
securities. Certain preferred stock issues may themselves approach the
debt/equity line.253 While most "preferred stock" securities are pre-
247. Id. at 757.
248. See infra Section VI.B.
249. 75 F.2d at 757-58. See also McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 366-67 (9th Cir.
1968) (whether payment can be made on debentures received in exchange for equity must be deter-
mined as of time payments are to be made, rather than at time of original exchange).
250. See, eg., FDIC v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir.)
(Robinson and its progeny followed in bank receivership), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983); In re
Hawaii Corp., 694 F.2d 179, 181 (9th Cir. 1982) (Robinson followed in subordinating debt received
in exchange for equity); McConnell v. Estate of Butler, 402 F.2d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (Robinson
followed in subordinating debentures received in exchange for equity); In re Vadnais Lumber Sup-
ply, Inc., 100 B.R. 127, 136, 140 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (corporate debt incurred in exchange for
redemption of stock by insiders avoided on fraudulent transfer theory, with court noting that such
debt could also be subordinated under Robinson).
251. See, eg., In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
252. See supra note 250.
253. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 450-57.
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sumptively equity,254 this may not always be true. Therefore, if a court
can fairly characterize exchanged securities as debt rather than equity, it
should not apply the Robinson doctrine. Instead, the court should apply
the analysis normally used for debt received in exchange for other
debt.2 5
2. Debt Received in Exchange for Other Debt
a. Same-Issuer Debt
Where holders receive debt securities in exchange for other securities
of the issuer, one must first consider the characteristics of the original
securities. If the original securities had primarily equity characteristics,
then the analysis will be substantially the same as that applied in cases in
which holders receive debt securities in exchange for equity securities of
the issuer.
If, however, the original securities clearly were debt, then the analysis
should turn to the characteristics of the new securities. That the holders
took the new securities in exchange for debt will not prevent them from
being equity. After all, one of the chief purposes of exchange offers is to
lighten burdens on the issuer, and equity-type securities are less burden-
some to a distressed issuer than pure debt. Exchange offers frequently
offer equity instruments in exchange for debt that has proven too burden-
some;25 6 once such an exchange is made prior to bankruptcy, a bank-
ruptcy court will give full effect to the exchange, treating the exchanging
holders as having purely equity interests in the debtor.
b. Other-Issuer Debt
Normally, courts should treat securities holders receive in exchange
for the securities of other issuers as if they had been issued for cash.
Special considerations may apply, however, if the issuers are affiliated,
and particularly if both are parties in the same or related bankruptcy
cases.
c. Debt Received in Exchange for Claims in a Case Under
Chapter 11
One feature of the current bankruptcy climate is that debtors increas-
254. Id.
255. See infra Section V.C.2.
256. See BRUCK, supra note 24, at 75-77.
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ingly will fie for bankruptcy more than once.2 7 This does not necessar-
ily mean that the subsequent petitions are vexatious or filed in bad faith.
Many of the repeat filings are by debtors who confirmed plans of reor-
ganization in one bankruptcy case, and then, for a variety of reasons, had
to file new bankruptcy petitions for the reorganized entities.258 More-
over, distressed debtors are increasingly turning to "prepackaged Chap-
ter 11" bankruptcy cases in place of more traditional debt-security
exchange offers.259 A debtor in this position is comparable to, and faces
the same risks as, one who has attempted to restructure debt through an
exchange offer.
The risks to a reorganized company tend to be high, and, despite com-
plete good faith of the parties in formulating and conforming to the plan
of reorganization, the reorganized corporation may itself have to file for
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court considering such a secondary bank-
ruptcy case should, among other things, consider the status of the securi-
ties issued pursuant to the first plan of reorganization.
257. Although the Bankruptcy Code bars an individual debtor from receiving a discharge in a
case commenced fewer than six years after a prior discharge, 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) and (9) (1988),
nothing in the Code prevents a corporate debtor from commencing a new bankruptcy case following
the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1988). There is, however, a
judicially created doctrine that a court may dismiss a bankruptcy case if the bankruptcy petition is
filed in "bad faith." See In re Kerr, 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Coastal Cable T.V.,
Inc., 709 F.2d 762, 764-65 (1st Cir. 1983); In re Lindbergh Plaza Assoc., 115 B.R. 202, 206 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1990); In re Tinti Constr. Co., 29 B.R. 971, 974-75 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983); Edith H.
Jones, The "Good Faith" Requirement in Bankruptcy, 1988 ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 45; Robert L. Ordin, The Good Faith Principle in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus.
LAW. 1795 (1983).
258. See, eg., In re Braniff Airlines, 118 B.R. 819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
259. In a prepackaged Chapter 11, the debtor and its principal creditors work out an agreement
for re-adjustment of the debtor's obligations before the debtor files its bankruptcy petition. The
workout takes the form of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization plan, including the debtor's issue
of new securities in substitution for its pre-plan obligations. The debtor submits the plan for ap-
proval by its creditors and interest holders simultaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
Prepackaged plans of this kind, if practicable, offer greater certainty than non-bankruptcy workouts,
and are less expensive to all parties than full-scale Chapter 11 reorganizations. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1121(a), 1123, 1125, 1126 (1988); Richard L. Epling, Exchange Offers, Defaults, and Insolvency:
A Short Primer, 8 BANKR. DEVELOPMENTS J. 15, 34-42 (1991); Claudia MacLachlan, Prepackaged
Bankruptcy Stumbles, NAr'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 1; Diana B. Henriques, Troubled Times on Wall
Street. Future Buzzwords Rise From Ashes of the '80's, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1991, at DI; Paul
Richter, Corporations Learn to Tilt Bankruptcy In Their Favor, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at Al.
From the first quarter of 1990 through the first quarter of 1991, at least six major corporations-
Southland, Kroy, Arizona Biltmore Hotel, 14 Wall Street Associates, La Salle Energy, Circle Ex-
press, and Angelo Energy-filed and confirmed prepackaged Chapter 11 cases. 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) #17, at Al and A4 (April 18, 1991).
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The best analysis of such securities indicates that the court should
treat them as if their issue, although in exchange for old securities of the
debtor in the first reorganization case, were an initial public offering.
The reorganized entity is completely new and it issues securities on the
premise that, with plan confirmation having discharged its former obliga-
tions, it is viable as reorganized.2" Therefore, only the inherent charac-
teristics of the reorganization securities themselves need be considered if
it is necessary to examine their status in a subsequent bankruptcy case.
VI. OTHER ISSUES JUNK BONDS RAISE IN
THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT
The debt/equity issue, while central to the treatment of junk bonds in
bankruptcy, is not the only issue they raise. It does, however, substan-
tially affect the resolution of other issues raised concerning junk bond
treatment in bankruptcy.
A. Original Issue Discount
Even if a court does not recharacterize a junk bond issue as equity,
substantial questions may arise as to the amount of claims based on such
an issue that the court can allow in bankruptcy. The most important
such question arises from the use of original issue discount (OID).
Claims for unmatured interest are not normally allowable in bank-
ruptcy,261 but the Bankruptcy Code does not provide guidance as to how
courts should compute such unmatured interest when firms use original
issue discount rather than periodic interest to compensate holders of debt
instruments for the use of their funds.262
260. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1988) (confirmation of plan requires court finding that liquida-
tion or further reorganization is unlikely to be needed, unless proposed by the plan); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1141(c) and (d) (1988) (with certain exceptions, confirmation of plan discharges debtor from pre-
bankruptcy claims and interests, and property the plan disposed of is free of all pre-bankruptcy
claims and interests).
261. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1988). The one exception to this rule is that interest may continue to
accrue against any amount by which a claim is oversecured. II U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988). See also
United States v. Ron Pair Enters. (In re Ron Pair Enters.), 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
262. Bankruptcy Code § 502(b)(2) (1988) merely provides that a claim is not allowable to the
extent that "such claim is for unmatured interest." Neither Code § 502 nor the Code's general
definitional section, § 101, define "interest" or "unmatured interest." The legislative history of the
provision, of little more help, expressly notes that OID not accrued as of the date of a bankruptcy
petition constitutes "unmatured interest" and therefore must be disallowed, but gives no guidance as
to how to compute the interest other than a statement that it has to be "prorated." S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1978). See infra notes 265-75 and accompanying text.
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Recent cases have dealt with the OID issue at the bankruptcy court
level; 263 their inconsistency shows the need for a standard rule. The
problems concern not whether unaccrued OID is allowable in bank-
ruptcy-the legislative history of Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(2)
makes clear that it is not,264 and the courts, in the few cases decided on
the issue, have consistently so held 26 5-- rather what the initial discount
was (a problem when the holders received the discounted obligations in
exchange for other obligations or securities of the debtor), and what
method the courts should use in computing interest accrued between the
time of issue and the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
In In re Allegheny International, Inc. ,266 the court had to compute
OID on junk bonds that the debtor issued, almost four years before its
bankruptcy, in exchange for an issue of preferred stock. 267 Faced with a
complete lack of guidance from the Bankruptcy Code and its legislative
history, the bankruptcy court declined to follow tax law. 268 The court
valued the junk bonds in question, computing their issue price for OID
purposes, based on their market value on the first day of their issue; the
tax rule would have valued them based on the market value of the securi-
ties exchanged for them.269 The court offered no bankruptcy-based rea-
son for its rule. In computing the accrual of interest from this initial
value to the date of bankruptcy, the court similarly declined to follow tax
law, 270 and computed accrual on a straight-line basis,2 71 rather than ap-
plying the constant-interest method 272 that tax and financial accounting
263. In re Public Service Co., No. 88-00043, 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 850 (Bankr. D.N.H.
April 13, 1990); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Chateaugay
Corp., 109 B.R. 51 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10059 (S.D.N.Y. July 23,
1991).
264. See supra note 262.
265. In re Public Service Co., 20 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 850-52; In re Chateaugay Corp., 109
B.R. at 54-57; In re Allegheny Int'l, 100 B.R. at 249-252, 255.
266. 100 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
267. No one seems to have raised the issue of subordination or reclassification under Robinson v.
Wangemann and its progeny. See supra notes 246-55 and accompanying text.
268. I.R.C. § 1232(b)(1) (1984) and associated Treasury Regulation § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(iii)(c)
(1984) (as of the time of the exchange offer), corresponding to current § 1272 and associated regs.
269. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. at 252-54.
270. I.R.C. § 1232 (1984) (as of the time of the exchange offer), corresponding to current § 1272.
271. Straight-line accrual computes interest by subtracting the initial value of the securities in
question from the maturity value, dividing the difference by the number of months from issue date to
maturity, and multiplying the quotient thus obtained by the number of months from issue to bank-
ruptcy. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. at 254.
272. The constant interest method finds overall interest owed in the same way as the straight-line
method, viz, by subtracting the initial value of the securities from their value at maturity. The
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principles required. While the court justified its refusal to follow tax law
based on the legislative history's statement that OID accrual should be
computed by proration,273 there is no logical reason why proration must
be on a straight-line, rather than a constant-interest, basis.
In In re Chateaugay Corp. ,274 on the other hand, the bankruptcy court
followed tax principles. The holders had received the securities in ques-
tion pursuant to the debtor's exchange offer. Debt securities were ex-
changed for new debt-denominated securities with different interest rates,
maturity dates, and sinking fund requirements, plus common stock of the
issuer.275 Although the bankruptcy court declined to follow Allegheny, it
did compare the legislative history of Bankruptcy Code section 502(b)(2)
with that of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA),2 7 6 concluding that TEFRA was not only not inconsistent
with the Bankruptcy Code provision, but it also offered a good interpre-
tation of "proration" for purposes of complying with Bankruptcy Code
section 502(b)(2)'s legislative history. Accordingly, the Chateaugay
court held that the proper initial valuation of the new securities received
under the exchange offer should be the market value of the old securities
exchanged therefore, and that accrual of interest on the new securities
should be computed under the constant interest method.277
The Chateaugay approach clearly is more sensible than that taken in
Allegheny. The constant-interest method measures interest costs to the
issuer more accurately than the straight-line method, as the Senate Fi-
nance Committee noted in its report on TEFRA.278 In addition, it
makes sense to follow a single rule, consistent with the principles of fi-
nancial accounting, rather than to permit bankruptcy courts to choose
methods of computation essentially ex aequo et bono, until courts of ap-
peals can decide the question-at which time there may not only be dif-
accrual, however, is computed differently-as compound interest-by finding an interest rate for the
first year of accrual, accruing imputed interest for a first year, and then applying the same interest
rate successively for each year until maturity to the initial principal amount plus the imputed interest
for each preceding year. The amount accrued at the date of bankruptcy is total accrued interest up
to that date. It will be a lower number than that found by the straight-line method, and thereby will
increase the amount of nonallowable, unmatured interest on a given claim. See In re Chateaugay
Corp., 109 B.R. 51, 57-58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
273. 100 B.R. at 254.
274. 109 B.R. 51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
275. Id. at 52, 56.
276. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
277. See supra note 275, at 57-58.
278. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 210, 212 (1982).
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ferent tax and bankruptcy rules, but different bankruptcy rules in each
circuit.
B. Fraudulent Transfer Issues
Fraudulent transfer law is an ancient body of law279 that has become
an integral part of the bankruptcy process. 280 It protects creditors-rep-
resented in bankruptcy by the trustee in bankruptcy, or the debtor-in-
possession in Chapter 11 reorganizations-by enabling them to avoid
certain pre-bankruptcy transfers by a debtor that deplete the debtor's es-
tate of property, which, absent the transfers, would have been available
to satisfy the creditors' claims.
The application of fraudulent transfer law to large corporate transac-
tions, and particularly to LBOs,2 8 1 has aroused considerable controversy
in recent years.2 82 The use of junk bonds materially affects the applica-
279. Fraudulent transfer law dates back at least as far as Roman law; it was mentioned as early
as 65 B.C. in an early letter of Cicero, and was generally stated in the Institutes of Justinian, 4,6,6
(ca. 533 A.D.). See, eg., Max Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L. REV. 109
(1931). Modern Anglo-American fraudulent transfer law is traditionally traced from the statute of
13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570), though in fact English fraudulent conveyance law substantially predates this
statute. See, eg., 50 Edw. III, ch. 6 (1376). While some states, such as Illinois, still follow variants
of the statute of 13 Eliz., a majority of states now follow modern statutes. For purposes of this
discussion, modem statutes include 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988), the 1984 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT (UFTA), and the 1917 UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AcT (UFCA).
280. Professor Clark has argued, with considerable force, that fraudulent transfer law can be
seen as a paradigm for much of what bankruptcy law seeks to accomplish in rectifying certain credi-
tors' inequitable pre-bankruptcy conduct. See Clark, supra note 78, at 517-62 (norms of fraudulent
transfer law can be seen to justify most powers of the trustee in bankruptcy, including equitable
subordination). The Bankruptcy Code has its own specific fraudulent transfer section, 11 U.S.C.
§ 548 (1988). The trustee in bankruptcy (or debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case) also can
apply applicable state fraudulent transfer law to challenge a transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)
(1988).
281. The analysis here applied to LBOs applies equally to similar transactions, also common
during the late 1980s, called leveraged recapitalizations. In a leveraged recapitalization, a corpora-
tion exchanges a large proportion of its equity capitalization for debt by borrowing large sums and
paying most of the amounts borrowed as dividends to its shareholders. Thus, as in an LBO, large
amounts are paid to stockholders and the corporation is left with a far higher proportion of debt
than before the transaction; but, unlike an LBO, the corporation is left with the same shares out-
standing, and largely the same stockholders, now left holding "stubs" worth far less than their shares
prior to the dividend payment. Junk bonds are, as in LBOs, an important means employed for such
borrowing. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., Tender Offers: Offensive and Defensive Tactics and the Bus-
nessJudgment Rule, in I CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 7, 196-203 (Co-Chairman Dennis J.
Block & Harvey L. Pitt, PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 730, 1991).
282. See, e.g., Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Wieboldt Stores, Inc.
v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 496, 499-504 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co.,
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tion of fraudulent transfer law to transactions such as LBOs, and raises
certain fraudulent transfer issues in and of itself.
Modem fraudulent transfer law has established two broad categories
of transfers avoidable as "fraudulent:" those transfers the debtor makes
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,283 and those that
are "constructively fraudulent." While one should not exclude the possi-
bility of invalidating a large corporate transaction such as an LBO based
on actual intent, 284 most challenges to such transactions are based on
claims that they are constructively fraudulent.
A successful challenge to a transfer on grounds of constructive fraud
must establish two basic elements: 1) the transferor received less than
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer;285 and 2) the
transfer was made while the transferor was insolvent, or rendered the
transferor insolvent;286 or the transfer left the transferor with insufficient
capital for its business or for a transaction in which it was engaged; 287 or
the transferor made the transfer at a time when it intended to incur, or
believed that it would incur, debts beyond its ability to pay as they came
due. 28
8
The first element of a constructively fraudulent transfer has raised
some debate in the LBO context. In an LBO, the acquiring entity, whose
shareholders often include key members of the target corporation's man-
agement, borrows a large percentage of the funds it uses to buy the tar-
get's shares.28 9 The purchaser encumbers the target's assets to secure the
629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985); In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc., 100 B.R. 127, 134-41
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Morse Tool, Inc., 108 B.R. 389, 390-91 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Ohio
Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1988); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Do-
main, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985); David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20
GA. L. REV. 73 (1985); Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and
the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. LJ. 781 (1988); Kevin J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Con-
veyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987); Mary Goulet, The Rights of
Debtholders When a Leveraged Corporation Fails, 15 J. CORP. L. 257 (1990).
283. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988); UFTA § 4(a)(1); UFCA § 7.
284. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d at 1304-1305 (LBO transactions held
fraudulent by actual intent).
285. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988); UFTA §§ 4(a)(2) and 5(a). The UFCA uses the term
"fair consideration" instead of "reasonably equivalent value," but the two concepts are quite similar.
The only difference is that "fair consideration" requires not only an equivalent value, but also that
the transfer be made in "good faith." UFCA §§ 3-6.
286. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988); UFTA § 5(a); UFCA § 4.
287. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988); UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i); UFCA § 5.
288. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988); UFTA § 4(a)(2)(ii); UFCA § 6.
289. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d 1288, 1292 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
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senior debt used for this purpose. The target will normally assume the
entire acquisition debt. In larger LBOs, such debt will have several dif-
ferent strata of seniority, ranging from secured debt at the top to one or
more layers of junk bonds at the bottom.290 These junk bonds will tend
to be deeply subordinated, both structurally and by subordination agree-
ments the parties execute as part of the financing for the overall
transaction.
Under the first element for finding a transaction constructively fraudu-
lent, the issue is whether the target receives reasonably equivalent value
in exchange for the liens it grants and the obligations it incurs pursuant
to the LBO. If the borrowing and payment of shareholders are treated as
part of a single transaction, creditor advances do not constitute reason-
ably equivalent value because they do not benefit the target, but rather its
former shareholders.291
While the existence or nonexistence of reasonably equivalent value in
LBOs remains controversial, a challenge to a transaction as construc-
tively fraudulent also must prove the second element.2 92 It is with re-
spect to this element that recharacterization of junk bonds emerges as a
potential defense against fraudulent transfer actions in the LBO context.
L Solvency Questions
Statutes that make the insolvency of the debtor an element of a con-
structively fraudulent transfer generally follow the "bankruptcy" defini-
tion of insolvency: a debtor is insolvent for fraudulent transfer purposes
if the sum of the debtor's obligations exceeds the value of the debtor's
assets.2 93 If the debtor is a junk bond issuer, the status of its junk bonds
as debt or equity will materially affect its solvency under this definition.
If the bonds are debt, even though subordinated, the debtor's obligations
483 U.S. 1005 (1987); REED, supra note 49, at 106 (purchasers' equity in LBOs is often less than 5%
of the target's value).
290. REED, supra note 49, at 117-19.
291. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty, 803 F.2d at 1302 (affirming district court in col-
lapsing secured borrowing and payment of stockholders into one transaction, and finding lack of fair
consideration); In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. D. Ohio 1986). But see In re
Greenbrook Carpet Co., 722 F.2d 659 (1lth Cir. 1984) (court declined to view borrowing and pay-
ment to shareholders as parts of a single transaction).
292. See, eg., Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F.2d 1368 (D.N.J. 1984) (fraudulent transfer
challenge dismissed for failure to prove debtor's insolvency).
293. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(31) and 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988); UFTA §§ 2 and 5(a); UFCA §§ 2 and 4.
UFTA § 2(b) also establishes a presumption that a debtor is insolvent for fraudulent transfer pur-
poses if it is equity insolvent, i.e., if it is generally not paying its debts as they come due.
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to pay on them will be included among the obligations weighed against
the issuer's assets in determining whether it is bankruptcy insolvent;294 if
equity, they should not be so included.
The effect of recharacterization on the solvency question means that it
not only places a sword in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy, but a
potential shield in the hands of LBO lenders and former shareholders
who tendered their shares pursuant to an LBO. In a suit to avoid LBO
payments and lien creation, defendants of this kind could assert that the
junk bonds created pursuant to the LBO were actually equity. This
recharacterization would reduce the amount of debt to be weighed
against the value of the debtor's assets, and thereby would increase the
chances that the debtor was neither insolvent at the time of the LBO, nor
thereby rendered insolvent.2 95 Moreover, a court that recharacterizes
one or more junk bond issues of a post-LBO as equity is less likely to find
the existence of one of the alternatives to insolvency as a fraudulent
transfer element-that it had unreasonably small capital for its business,
or that it expected to incur debt beyond its ability to repay.
2. Treatment of Payments of Interest and Principal
If a junk bond issue is actually disguised equity, payments denomi-
nated as interest thereon may actually constitute dividends.296 In addi-
tion to having corporate-law implications,297 this characterization may
subject such payments to scrutiny under the fraudulent transfer laws.
Normally, the law considers payments on an antecedent debt to be made
in exchange for reasonably equivalent value.2 98 If, however, the pay-
ments are distributions on an equity investment, reasonably equivalent
value is not normally present.299
294. See In re Ultimite Corp., 207 F.2d 427, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1953) (voluntary subordination of
certain claims did not reduce total debt of corporation for solvency purposes); Herzog & Zweibel,
supra note 32, at 87.
295. See generally, REED, supra note 49, at 169.
296. See, eg., Sheppard, supra note 30, at 1146.
297. See infra Section VI.D.
298. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(a) (1988); UFTA § 3(a); UFCA § 3(a); Mayo v. Pioneer Bank &
Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823, 830-31 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Cohen v. Suther-
land, 257 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1958); Inland Sec. Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 347
(W.D. Mo. 1974).
299. See In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 982 (1st Cir. 1983); In re Vadnais Lumber Supply,
Inc., 100 B.R. 127, 136 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
1991] 1195
Washington University Open Scholarship
1196 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:1137
C. Preference Issues
A closely related issue concerns the attacks on preferences under the
Bankruptcy Code. 300 The preference provisions of Code section 547 pro-
mote equality of distribution of the debtor's assets among its creditors301
by giving the trustee in bankruptcy 30 2 the power to avoid payments the
debtor makes to a creditor, on an antecedent debt, if the debtor makes
those payments during the 90 days before bankruptcy, 0 3 while the
debtor was insolvent, 3° and if they enabled the creditor to receive more
than it would have received in a liquidation of the debtor had the pay-
ment not been made.
For preference purposes, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent
during the 90 days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 30 5 This
presumption is rebuttable, and no such presumption applies to the period
from 90 days to one year before bankruptcy during which insider prefer-
ences are avoidable. Thus, for purposes of proving that the debtor was
not insolvent during the preference period, recharacterization of junk
bonds as equity may offer a preference defense much like that described
above for fraudulent transfer actions.
D. Recoveries By the Trustee Under Corporate Law
The trustee in bankruptcy possibly may recover on behalf of creditors
under sources of law other than traditional debtor-creditor law. Corpo-
rate law may provide one such source of recovery to supplement recov-
eries under fraudulent transfer law.3°6
1. Management Fiduciary Duties
Under standard principles of corporate law, management owes fiduci-
300. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
301. Begier v. I.R.S., 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2263 (1990) (Bankruptcy Code § 547(b) promotes equality
among creditors by preventing debtor from favoring one creditor over another shortly before
bankruptcy).
302. Or the debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 reorganization case.
303. One year before bankruptcy if the creditor was an "insider" of the debtor. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
304. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988). Insolvency for preference purposes is defined as it is for
fraudulent transfers, as "balance-sheet," or bankruptcy insolvency, under 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). In re
Taxman Clothing Co., 905 F.2d 166, 168 (7th Cir. 1990).
305. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1988).
306. See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 507.12 (N.D. II1. 1988) (debtor-in-
possession stated causes of action against debtor's former directors for breach of fiduciary duty and
violation of Illinois Business Corporations Act by improper distributions).
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ary duties to stockholders. It owes these duties to corporate creditors
only if the corporation is insolvent.3 "7 Junk bonds, as hybrid instru-
ments, raise questions as to whether corporate management owes fiduci-
ary duties to their holders, and as to the extent of such duties.3"' If
management breached these duties, creditors-and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, standing in their shoes-may recover for the breach.3"9
2. Dividend Issues
If junk bonds are in fact equity, then state corporate statutes that regu-
late equity distributions, dividends and redemption of shares, may limit
distributions made on such issues.3 0 Under the corporate law of most
states, insolvent firms may make no such distributions.31' Improper dis-
tributions may be recovered from the directors who authorized them,312
and, under more limited circumstances," 3 from those who received
them.31 4
Distributions of interest and principal on a junk bond issue may thus
be subject to recovery as improper dividends if the issue is recharacter-
307. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 64, at 667, 667-68, 733; Morey W. McDaniel,
Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 442-450 (1986) (advocating creation of
general fiduciary duties to bondholders); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1175 (rev. perm. ed. 1986) (under one theory, corporate officers
are trustees for creditors of an insolvent corporation).
308. See Bratton, Convertible Bonds, supra note 64, at 732 (fiduciary duties could be imputed to
convertible bondholders based on characterizing their conversion privileges as an equity interest).
309. See Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. at 507-510 (debtor-in-possession stated
claim against debtor's former directors for breach of fiduciary duties).
310. Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1941) (since purported debt actually
constituted equity, pre-bankruptcy interest payments thereon "were dividends").
311. See, eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 1986).
312. See, eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719(a)(1) (McKinney 1986); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v.
Schottenstein, 94 B.R. at 510-12 (debtor-in-possession stated claim against debtor's former directors
for improper distributions to shareholders under Illinois Business Corporation Act); United States v.
Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583-85 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (creditors entitled to recover from
directors and controlling shareholders authorizing improper distribution to shareholders under
Pennsylvania corporate law), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d
1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
313. Recovery from shareholders receiving an illegal distribution (as opposed to recovery from
directors authorizing the distribution) normally requires that the corporation have been insolvent at
the time of the distribution, or that the shareholders had knowledge that the distribution was illegal.
See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 719(d)(1) (McKinney 1986).
314. See Reilly v. Segert, 201 N.E.2d 444 (Ill. 1964); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 719(d)(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1986), REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.42(b)(2); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note
18, at 903-04.
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ized as equity.3 15 Recoveries of this kind would involve different parties
than in the case of the fraudulent transfer theory noted above, since au-
thorizing directors as well as actual recipients of the distributions could
be subject to liability and since the elements of proof also would differ. 31 6
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the recent junk bond explosion of the 1980s, the bank-
ruptcy courts have begun dealing with resultant junk bond problems.
They should realize that, despite the broad use of the "junk bond" label,
there are many different kinds of junk bonds, and that a court dealing
with the bankruptcy of a junk bond issuer must determine the status of
each of the issuer's securities based on the issue's own inherent
characteristics.
A bankruptcy court dealing with a junk bond issue should presume
that the bond indenture should be enforced in bankruptcy as the parties
intended. Nonetheless, if the characteristics of an issue are predomi-
nantly those of an equity instrument, it would be unfair to the debtor's
genuine creditors for a court not to consider recharacterizing the issue as
equity for bankruptcy purposes. In deciding whether to do so, the court
should take into account the normal equitable principles of bankruptcy
law, and, where specific bankruptcy authority is unavailable, should refer
carefully to the courts' more extensive experience with tax law rather
than building a new legal edifice from first principles.
This Article has made a broad survey of the issues that junk bonds
raise in the bankruptcy context. Its coverage has necessarily been less
than comprehensive, since it intends primarily to begin discussion of
these issues rather than to deal with them definitively. This Article seeks
to establish a framework for further discussion of these questions and of
related questions that may arise, such as securities law issues that result
from the bankruptcy of junk bond issuers. Further exploration of this
315. See Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1941).
316. Instead of proving that the transferor was bankruptcy-insolvent or undercapitalized, and
made a transfer for less than reasonably equivalent value, the plaintiff would have to prove that
defendants were directors and voted for distributions in violation of state dividend or share redemp-
tion law (or were shareholders and received such improper distributions with knowledge of the im.
propriety). This proof generally involves equity insolvency rather than bankruptcy insolvency. In
many states, even if the corporation is not insolvent, an improper distribution can be based on proof
that it exceeds the corporation's balance-sheet surplus. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 102
(a)(8), 510, 719(a) (McKinney 1986).
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field will become increasingly important as the junk bond issuers of the
1980s find their way to the bankruptcy courts of the 1990s.
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